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VOLUME 11 WINTER 1966 NUMBER 2
OLD KONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND KARL'S NEW KODE:
AN ESSAY ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
OUR NEW COMMERCIAL LAW
By EUGENE F. MOONEYt
THE CONTRACT PARABLE*
W HEN THE WORLD was very young and long before society
reached its present state of perfection people began making
contracts. Freud's Oedipus Legend recites that the Primeval Father
and the Primeval Mother had an exclusive dealing arrangement. The
Brother Clan by mutual agreement killed the Father and appropriated
the Mother for their own use. Thereafter to keep peace among them-
selves they entered into the Social Contract. This was the first Bilateral
Contract. Despite good intentions, however, the parties constantly
bickered over this unwritten contract and it became apparent the entire
venture needed to be reconstituted.
When God opened negotiations with the Children of Israel they
promptly demanded a firm written offer which would satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, so Moses was sent back up Mount Sinai to draft the stone
tablets. The essence of the offer was that if the Children of Israel
would act a certain way then God would do thus and so. This was the
first Unilateral Contract. Early construction of the contract was in
strict compliance with the Parol Evidence Rule, but subsequent liberal
interpretation discovered it was open-ended so Gentiles could be in-
t A.B., 1957, LL.B., 1958 University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1963, Yale Uni-
versity; Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
* Inspiration for this parable summing up all the author has been able to learn
about the law of contract, and, indeed for this entire article is traceable directly to
D. J. Swift Teufelsdrockh, Jurisprudence, The Crown of Civilization - Being Also
The Principles of Writing Jurisprudence Made Clear To Neophytes, 5 U. CHI.L.
Rlv. 171 (1938). Most of the principles set forth in that article have been here
employed: it was impossible to capture the style but hopefully some of the overtones
of that article also appear here.
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cluded and Subcontracting was permitted. This should have been a
sufficient arrangement for everyone. The Farmers were reasonably
satisfied with it but the Merchants were not. Moreover, despite a con-
siderable interpretive gloss a number of loopholes-were uncovered and
the terms were too harsh because the Contract required that all Sub-
contracts be fully performed.
So the next attempt took up the problem of what agreements
should be enforced. Both the Romans and Early Church Fathers were
inclined to enforce all agreements if there was causa. But foreign
merchants were notoriously Godless men who would take one's money
and give him nothing so we let them make up their own law. Thus two
or three different approaches developed over the centuries: 1) The
Romans simply required fair dealing in Good Faith and enforced every
agreement except a nudum pactum, 2) Other Europeans were more
realistic and required the posting of hostages as security for perform-
ance of the undertaking, 3) The English were the most realistic and
required the assumpsit to be sworn out twice, put in writing, a hostage
be posted and a quid pro quo be given. This was the beginning of the
Common Law of Contract. The Foreign Merchant Problem was
solved when Lord Mansfield began to let them sue on their contracts
in his Common Law Court in order to keep them out of Equity.
Things moved swiftly after that and within a few. centuries we
dropped the purely ceremonial requirements of the English system.
When Slade's case broke in 1606 no one was outraged that only a
single sworn assumpsit was required and if supported by a peppercorn it
was binding. We discovered that good faith actually had nothing to do
with contract, which was an omnipotent expression of human will bind-
ing on the courts, society and God in that order. The English Sale of
Goods Act was the final expression of a matchless state of contract
perfection, embodying the true meaning of contract as a legal obliga-
tion arising out of a promise supported by consideration.
So you see when we all came over to America the whole matter
had settled into black-letter rules: 1) Contracts must be covered by a
writing and supported by consideration, for it would be immoral to
allow them out in public nude and without visible means of support,
2) Foreign merchants have their own law which is too devious for
common lawyers, 3) Mutual assent to a contract embodies Omnipotent
Human Will and is the only obligation binding anyone to do anything
for anyone else so it should be strictly construed, and 4) God can revoke
His offer at any time before it is accepted by the requested act; but if He
defaults no decree for specific performance will issue although He may
have to answer to a writ of indebitatus assumpsit.
[VOL. 11 : p. 213
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Is THERE A CONTRACT? WHAT THE HELL!'
The subject is almost as insane as the parable. One recalls with
horror his first semester in law school and the course in Contracts I.
The whole matter of offer, acceptance and consideration is deliciously
painful, like "possession" in Personal Property, "seizin" in Real Prop-
erty, and "duty" in Torts. Struggling through cases deliberately chosen
by the case book editor to bewilder, one sought guidance from Williston,
Corbin, and the Restatement of Contracts. Yet they all seemed to
say the same thing in much the same words with only nitpicking differ-
ences, and in desperation one committed to memory the miniscule dis-
tinctions in dogma drawn by Williston and Corbin and struck the
balance where he thought the Restatement dictated. All this frantic
mental juggling took place without for a moment understanding what
it was all about, if anything. One thing was clear, however: The
traditional contract construct was the key to Paradise and one learned
it or flunked.
Actually, the construct was quite simple and easy to understand
once it had been mentally assimilated. This was accomplished through
hours of unbelievable monotony in the library relieved by brief moments
of stark terror socratically superinduced in the classroom. We learned
that there are certain expressions of mutual assent to which the law
appends an obligation arising from the express or plainly implied
"promises" of the parties. The legal obligation is strictly limited to
the promises. These promises are discovered in the unvarying method
by which human beings contract with each other, namely, by means of
"offers" embodying "promises" directed by "offerors" to particular
"offerees" who "accept" by manifesting assent either by tendering a
promise or an act. The agreement thus made is enforcible at law or in
equity if and only if the promises involved "detriment to the promisor."
Otherwise the agreement was not supported by "consideration" and was
a bare nudum pactum. Case variations were hung on the construct like
ornaments on a Christmas tree, glittering but essentially useless.
One visualized the whole thing as if it were a door hasp into which
the lock of consideration was snapped, or a hinge with the linchpin
of consideration fitting smoothly into the aligned holes. It was all so
professionally neat that one commentator was prompted to remark:
1. The subtitle is taken from the delightful "Ballade Of The Class in Contracts"
by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn which appears in LLSWSLLYN, PUT IN His THUMB
39-40 (1931), and which begins: "Is there a contract? What the hell I"
WINTER 1966]
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The Langdell School's amazing theory of consideration and uni-
lateral contract is not only the most familiar American example
[of 'the vigorous, almost rigid German theories of construction
and dogmatics'], but the most clean of line, most bald of eye-
deflecting cover: the consideration needed to support a promise
must be bargained for; it must be the precise something bargained
for; the something bargained for must be precise. Acceptance and
the provision of consideration coincide like equal triangles, super-
imposed, and, superposed, exclude all variant dimensions of 'con-
ditions.' If 'an act' is called for by an offer, that very 'act' com-
plete, and nothing else or less, though by a hair, is what is needed;
only the other party to the bargain can accept; only 'he' can give
consideration; only 'he' acquire rights. Nothing could be more
simply stated, more rigorously thought, more tightly integrated,
more fascinatingly absurd to teach, more easy to 'apply'.2
Such mental pictures were irresistible, and more than one lawyer upon
first discovering that the contract law of many other nations requires
neither "consideration" nor any functional equivalent has been heard
to remark querulously, "But what holds the contract together?"
From this simplistic construct of obligation-based-on-promise
derived all those conceptualistic torments of Contracts I. The concept
of "offer" brought forth problems involving "illusory" offers, agree-
ments to contract and bilateral-or-unilateralness, all of which stem in-
exorably from the conceptual necessity for discovering in the particular
fact-transaction the precise "power" created in the offeree. The notion
of "acceptance" spawned terrible classroom conundrums involving
communication of the acceptance and the absolute absurdity of the
"ribbon-matching" cases, culminating in the ever-fruitful offer-to-make-
a-unilateral-contract if the offeree will climb a flagpole (mow the lawn,
chop the wood, walk across a bridge, and so forth ad nauseum) which
is revoked at the last instant. Revocability also generated those hairy
problems concerning withdrawal of options and the burning question
whether revocation of the reward offered for Lincoln's assassin should
have been in a local, regional or national newspaper. Such technicali-
ties are absolute requisites when one believes that the promisor is in
complete control of his "offer" in every conceivable respect and is
entitled to receive from the promisee exactly what his offer demands in
precisely the manner it prescribes. The doctrine of consideration gave
us intellectual peppercorns. One grappled with such awe-inspiring
problems as benefit-to-the-promisee versus detriment-to-the-promisor,
whether a promise could be consideration for a promise, and whether
void, voidable, barred, redundant, economically valueless or silly
promises could be consideration for anything. The comfortable arti-
2. LLPWELLYN, JURISPRUDZNCS 172 (1962).
216 [VOL. 11 : p. 213
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ficialities of the traditional contract construct led Professor Llewellyn
to note with delicious irony that:
The rules of Offer and Acceptance have been worked over; they
have been written over; they have been shaped and rubbed smooth
with pumice, they wear the rich deep polish of a thousand class
rooms; they have a grip on the vision and indeed on the affections
held by no other rules 'of law,' real or pseudo. For it was Offer
and Acceptance which first led each of us out of laydom into The
Law. Puzzled, befogged, adrift in the strange words and tech-
nique of cases, with only our sane feeling of what was decent for
a compass, we felt the warm sun suddenly, we knew that we were
arriving, we knew we too could 'think like a lawyer': That was
when we learned to down seasickness as A revoked when B was
almost up the flag-pole. Within the first October, we had achieved
a technical glee in justifying judgment then for A; and succulent
memory lingers, of the way our dumber brethren were pilloried
as Laymen still."
This is a serious charge but the indictment is well-grounded.
A formidable bill of particulars was drawn up long ago by a distin-
guished group of legal realists which is devastating and persuasive
even today." Particular aspects of the construct have been successfully
challenged from time to time virtually since its inception by such
luminaries as Whittier, Ballantine, Oliphant, Ferson, Corbin and other
giants of contract law. Their assaults on the Langdell-Williston con-
struct were based mainly on specific manifestations of its illogic or in-
consistency. 5 But for forty years the most careful, persistent and
3. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer And Acceptance, I, 48 YALE
L.J. 1, 32 (1938).
4. One is entitled to make up his own list on this particular subject and without
inviting argument over jurisprudential labels the following men took scholarly issue
with the orthodox theory of contract - as represented by the sequence Langdell,
Williston, Restatement of Contracts - Walter Cook, Patterson, Restatement of
Restitution (Keener, Woodward and Cook) -Gardner, Oliphant, Underhill Moore,
Corbin, Havighurst, Sharp, Fuller, Beutel, Franklin Kessler McGovney Whittier,
Ballantine, Costigan, Gilmore, Jones, Sharp and, of course, Llewellyn. 'this listing
is suggested by Llewellyn, The Rule of Law In Our Case-Law, 47 YALE L.J. 1243,
1266-67 (1938) ; Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YAIA L.J. 704, 748 (1931);
Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALn L.J. 302, 303
(1964). These men are here identified as most closely related to a realist movement
in the field of contract, although they can properly be identified in a still larger
context as was done in Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. Rnv.
1222 (1931), especially reflected in his massive bibliography appended to that article.
Cf. Teufelsdrockh, Jurisprudence - The Crown of Civilization, supra note *, at 180.
5. The clearest-cut victory over Williston was scored by Professor Herman
Oliphant concerning the requirement of mutuality of obligation. See Oliphant,
Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law - I, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 705
(1925) ; the reply by Williston, The Effect Of One Void Promise In A Bilateral
Agreement, 25 COLUM. L. Rtv. 857 (1925) ; and the crusher by Oliphant, Mutuality
of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts At Law - II, 28 COLUM. L. Rzv. 997 (1928).
Another exchange carried on with genteel acrimony began with the publication of
Goble, Is An Offer A Promise?, 22 ILL. L. Rtv. 567 (1928) answered in the same
issue by Williston, Is An Offer A Promise?, 22 ILL. L. Rxv. 788 (1928), followed in
the next quarterly issue by Green, Is An Offer Always A Promise?, 23 ILL. L. Rzv.
WINTER 1966]
5
Mooney: Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Juri
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
•VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
effective critic of the Langdell-Williston-Restatement construct was
Professor Karl N. Llewellyn whose complaints pointed out the damag-
ingly unrealistic nature of the whole orthodox offer-acceptance-consid-
eration trichotomy and its progeny of meaningless technicalities.
Admitting that in its symmetry the construct appeared a thing of in-
tellectual beauty, Llewellyn could still pick out the flaw which made
it fatally defective:
It is not the structure, however sweet of logic and of line, that is
the essence. Langdell's construct points that moral: magnificent in
conception, impeccable in workmanship, it yet would not function;
men do not, and courts will not, work according to that pattern.
And that, in things of law, bars beauty. The history of the Lang-
dell conception is one of a delighted welcome by law-teachers,
which continues still, while piece after piece of the integrated whole
continues to be junked; the holes consume the structure. 6
Time after time and through cumulating instances he emphasized that
despite the doctrinal handcuffs the courts amazingly did justice, reached
results reasonable under the circumstances, and were perceptive to
the demands of a changing commercial society. Over and over he
emphasized that business arrangements, not family transactions, are a
more reasonable foundation upon which theories of contract should
be based, because
[I]t is not safe to reason about business cases from cases in
which an uncle became interested in having his nephew see Europe,
go to Yale, abstain from nicotine, or christen his infant heir
'Alvardus Torrington, III.' And it may even be urged that safe
conclusions as to business cases of the more ordinary variety
cannot be derived from what courts or scholars rule about the
idiosyncratic desires of one A to see one B climb a fifty-foot greased
flag-pole or push a peanut across the Brooklyn Bridge.
7
This is not only delightful criticism, it is trenchant good sense. The
overwhelming majority of contracts are made in the course of business
transactions, and of these the largest percentage are sale or sale-oriented
95 (1928), and the rejoinder by Williston, An Offer Is A Promise, 23 ILL. L. Rzv.
100 (1928), and surrejoinder by Green, Is An Offer Always A Promise?, 23 ILL. L.
l.v. 301 (1928). Painstakingly careful studies by Professor Arthur L. Corbin served
to keep the exchange from breaking out into a fistfight. Braucher, Offer and Accept-
ance In The Second Restatement, supra 
note 4.
6. LLWLLYN, JURISPRUDUNCS, supra note 2, at 173. Frank admiration of the
particular quality utility caused him to sing praises to Cheyenne decision-making.
LLZW4LLYN & HOJMEL, Txe CH5YZNN WAY 334-35 (1941). In his study of sales
warranty law he was caused to note that "there is no less predictable body of law
found on any books, or in any courts, any time or anywhere," supported by a tre-
mendous footnote reference. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, And Society II,
37 COLUM. L. Rev. 341, 368-69 (1937).
7. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance II, 48 YALg
L.J. 779, 785 (1939).
[VOL. 11 : p. 213
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/1
COMMERCIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
contracts. Yet virtually the entire American Bar is composed of
lawyers, judges and professors who were nurtured on the artificialities
of peppercornism. We are all comfortably at home there:
This is therefore no area of 'rules' to be disturbed. It is an area
where we want no disturbance, and will brook none. It is the
Rabbit-Hole down which we fell into the Law, and to him who
has gone down it, no queer phenomenon is strange; he has been
magicked; the logic of Wonderland we then entered makes mere
discrepant decision negligible. And it is not only hard, it is
obnoxious, for any of us who have gone through that experience
to even conceive of Offer and Acceptance as perhaps in need
of re-examination. 8
But re-examination was necessary and it could have been foreseen that
Llewellyn would be the one to do it.
Many good and valuable compilations of the particular Restate-
ment of Contracts rules changed by the Uniform Commercial Code
have appeared in print over the past fifteen years.9 These new rules
have almost uniformly been viewed by commentators as no more than
sensible exceptions to particular unfortunate rules of contract law
which had been negligently permitted to grow up unrelated to given
business practices. Business patterns had changed slightly, it was
generally supposed, and an old contract rule here and there needed
updating; or, perhaps, a given rule needed "re-examination" with an
eye toward creating still another narrow but necessary "exception" to
the general theory of contract. Back in 1950 even Professor Williston
could make his peace with most of the code rules on this basis, although
he seemed to suspect something more profound was afoot.10 Professor
8. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 32.
9. By 1954 the bibliography of legal articles on the Code was fourteen pages
long. WYPsiclN, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LEGAL
ARTICLES AND PUBLICATIONS (1954). Professor Robert Braucher for many years
reported annually on the current crop in the New York University publication Annual
Survey of American Law, until 1957; and for the past few years Professor LawrenceKing has included a list of code articles in his annual survey article in that publication.
For sheer quantity of legal writing nothing in modern legal history equals the output
by commentators on the Uniform Commercial Code. Forty-two jurisdictions had
adopted the Code by November 1965 and almost without fail a symposium issue of
the local law review has examined the impact of the Code on that state's pre-existing
law. In addition, an unknown number of official state publications sponsored by legis-
latures have similarly discussed section-by-section the Code impact. See: Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code: Its Effect Upon Cognate Missouri Statutes, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, REPORT
No. 15 (1954).
10. The thrust of Professor Williston's criticisms - confined as they were to
Article 2 - rested primarily on the "needless" language changes in the Code. His
original objection was grounded on his belief that any changes which were needed
could be made by amending the existing uniform acts, and that, consequently, there
was no necessity for a whole new statute. When the 1949 version was published,
Williston renewed his objections and noted: "I did not ...imagine a project to
restate or to reform the law so radically as the proposed Code seeks to do." Williston,
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Beutel was more explicit and perhaps equally unsuspecting in his own
way in 1952 when he complained of the Code that there seemed to
be mere changes in language and it was "The Lawyers and Bankers
Relief Act."' 1 Professor Waite's criticism similarly proceeded on the
ground that the Code amounted to no more than unnecessarily com-
plex language changes.' Most of the published comment opines that
basic contract principles remain unsullied despite drastic rule changes
in sales and security law.
There is a completely different, iconoclastic view of the matter,
one which ignores the slight modifications of particular rules and
focuses on the major jurisprudential shift in the structure of the con-
tract construct made by the Code. Commercial law in this country is
or soon will be the Uniform Commercial Code and thus is firmly rooted
in the rich soil of the "life-situation" of business agreements made in
the context of the contemporary processes of the primary commercial
activity in this country. This was done, insofar as statutory language
can do so, by framing the entire Code so as to ground the contract
obligation on good faith mercantile agreements embodying the parties'
bargain within the functional economic structures relating to goods
distribution in this country. No mere language change was contem-
plated. No mere piecemeal modification of Restatement rules was
involved. Not only was the amelioration of particular legalistic hard-
ships on business intended, nothing less than the substitution of a
11. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [F] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted,
61 YALe L.J. 334, 363 (1952). Professor Beutel was not only outraged about the
language changes which he considered "unnecessarily technical, new and erratic," but
even more, he was positively apoplectic over Article 4 dealing with bank collec-
tions, which he felt was "a piece of vicious class legislation." Id. at 337 and 357.
He, too, firmly believed that the Code would "serve no purpose except by its
complication and displacement of the law to create unnecessary business for the
lawyers and the courts." The high-pitched tenor of these objections seems to have
been induced by his belief that the 1952 Code was a product of a "sell-out" to the
bankers. Id. at 359-62. His reaction to the 1949 Code was along the same general
lines without the outraged tone. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code
As A Problem In Codification, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1951). See also
Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE
L.J. 364 (1952).
12. After studying the 1949 Draft of Article 2, Professor Waite came to the
conclusion that it offered no fundamental changes and was thus indefensibly complex.
He summarized his position thus:
[T]he proposal as it stands, though not a fundamental change in the existing law,
is a complete restatement of it; a rearrangement in part of the now familiar
Uniform Sales Act, a rephrasing of most of its provisions.
Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 Micd. L. Rev. 603, 604-05 (1950).
He recommended against adoption of the Code because "the only net profit to the
public in so doing would be an increase of business for the legal profession." Id. at 626.
An interesting reflection on the prediction that a "flood of litigation" would follow
adoption of the Code is the fact that there are so few cases available that no casebook
based solely on Code decisions has appeared by 1965. The net effect of Code adoption
seems to have been the diminution of litigation on commercial transaction matters.
Professor Savage writing in 1957 nowhere indicates that Pennsylvania experienced
an upsurge of commercial law litigation as a result of the Code. Savage, Commercial
Law, 1957 ANN. SURv. Am. L. 302.
[VOL. 11: p. 213
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dynamic and transactionally-oriented agreement construct for the old
and static offer-acceptance-consideration model was attempted.
Viewed thus, Code rule changes cannot meaningfully be examined
as mere isolated tailoring alterations. The old suit has been totally
remodelled, the high peaked lapels were blunted, the coat cut down to
be single-breasted, the padding excised from the shoulders and the
pleats removed from the pants. An old suit cut from the cloth of
the common law was turned into a modern set of threads. The new
suit could be described by noting the precise details of alteration in
terms such as freedom of contract, offer, acceptance, consideration,
assignability, statute of frauds, anticipatory repudiation and remedies,
but the true significance of the change in contract principles would be
missed. The suit is now designed not for the portly buyer and seller
of title to goods, but for the wiry, slender dealer in goods. One could
similarly list the many changes in the law of negotiable instruments
and in the law of secured transactions. But the former list would not
clearly reflect the real change made by the Code, and the latter list
would be so long and redundant that it would be buried under detail.
Only by viewing the whole Code and its constituent parts ideographi-
cally can the full impact of the change be understood. Examination
of these hundreds of changes by means of verbalinear analysis could
easily take longer than the sixteen years already spent drafting and
revising the Code. Even if it could be done, the point of primary
significance would escape notice again: the Uniform Commercial Code
was conceived, drafted, and enacted into statutory law as a code and
not a mere collection of statutory rules.'" As such it has unifying
features, threads running across the cloth, repeating patterns of rules
embodying concepts common to the whole, and legal "base lines"'14 along
13. It has been called the "lex Llewellyn." Franklin, On the Legal Method of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONrgMP. PROB. 330 (1951). A full analysis
of the "code" aspects of the UCC is Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodo-
logy, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291.
14. The concept of a legal "baseline" used here is derived from Llewellyn's terimi-
nology, principally manifested in footnote 45 on page 722 of his article, What Price
Contract?, supra note 4, where he is discussing the present disjunctions between legal
rules of contract law and actual business practices and attempting some formulation of
an approach to be taken to correct these defects. He notes: "Both ways and norms of
business practice may be firm at the center, but they are hazy at the edge; they offer
little sureness to guide in dealing with the outside and unusual case," and then follows
the footnote discussion on the "baseline" concept as applied to non-legal and legal
obligations in commercial contract contexts. Law should seek a baseline for behavior
compelled by the laws, because:
One main business of law is to set, to create, norms for such cases of conflicting
or uncertain expectation; equally so, whether it be the law of the state or the
by-law of the group. But such norms can be created wisely only in the light
of the standing practices to which the new norm will be added, or on which it
places a limiting definition. Hence one huge value of the informed court-of-the-
trade which knows and feels this background, i.e., of the specialized as contrasted
with the unspecialized arbitration tribunal. . . . Application of fixed rules of
contract-at-large has sense only when the case is so far removed from the run
of affairs that the decision cannot be regarded as having prospect of shaping
WINTER 1966]
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which the Code articles are laid out. Three of the most important
of these base lines are:
1) The legal obligation of contract arises from the agreement-in-
fact of the parties and not their 'promises';
2) The Code as a whole and each of its parts is predicated on a
functional economic construct of goods distribution in this
country and not on abstractions of the law of contracts;
3) The ultimate affirmative touchstone for judicial decision on
commercial contract matters under the Code is mercantile good
faith and fair dealing.
Copious quotations from Karl Llewellyn's writings are of greater
significance than mere criticisms from the past of the traditional con-
tract construct. They can be seen in retrospect as something more than
professorial bombast or persnickety complaints destined never to be
remembered. Because of the smashing legislative success of the Uniform
Commercial Code the attitudes and opinions of Karl Llewellyn can
be neither forgotten nor ignored.'" Those attitudes are built into
the Code forever.
future deals; and then only when speed of judicial administration outweighs the
chance of injustice to the litigants. And to conceive the application of such fixed
rules to make for 'certainty' is to confuse certainty to the lawyer in litigation with
approximate certainty in life to the people for whom law exists.
The proper function of "rules" thus conceived can only be effectively implemented
by knowledgeable judges who sit in the proud tradition of our common law. This
institution he undertook to describe in TH9 COMMON LAW TRADITION. But no less
important as an element of the "baseline" concept is frank understanding of how our
appellate judges behave, as distinguished from the role played in our law by paper
rules. Indeed, his entire concept of law centered on the behavior of our judges:
At the very heart, I suspect, is the behavior of judges, peculiarly that part of
their behavior which marks them as judges - those practices which establish
the continuity of their office with their predecessors and successors, and which
make official their contacts with other persons. . . . Close around it on the one'
hand lies the behavior of other government officials. On the other, the sets of
accepted formulae which judges recite, seek light from, try to follow. . . . Close
around these again, lie various persons' ideas of what the law is; and especially
their views of what it or some part of it ought to accomplish. . . . Farther from
the center lies legal and social philosophy - approaching the center more directly
in proportion as the materials with which it deals are taken directly from the
center. Part of law, in many aspects, is all of society, and all of man in society.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUm. L. Rrv. 431,
464-65 (1930). Llewellyn read commercial law decisions not so much for their "legal
doctrine" but for their facts, from whence he derived a broad understanding of the
principal commercial patterns in this country, and in true legal realist fashion he in-
sisted upon a narrow-issue formulation of problems. All these factors combined to
form his concept of a "baseline" when time came to draft legislation. The Uniform
Commercial Code can fairly be called a "common law code" in this context - a statute
derived from the common law of commercial transactions by means of close factually-
oriented analytical techniques incorporating insofar as possible an informed judgment
about what our courts are actually doing in the field, as distinguished from what they
may be "saying" in their opinions, all grounded ultimately on commercial patterns.
15. Whatever else one may say about the Code it is certainly "the law" effective
in at least thirty jurisdictions: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
[VOL. 11 : p. 213
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Llewellyn had formed most of his ideas about contract law before
he began drafting the Code. While in the midst of publishing a series
of brilliant articles undertaking a fundamental re-examination of the
law of commercial contracts, Llewellyn became the chairman of the
Code committee of the Commission on Uniform State Laws. During
the ensuing decade he worked unceasingly toward comprehensive codifi-
cation of commercial law.
Although much of the actual drafting of the various articles was
done by committees, Llewellyn was the coordinator and, as such, exer-
cised both tremendous influence and practical control over the whole
project. He and Professor Corbin served on the committee drafting
the sales article and in great measure Llewellyn wrote that section of
the Code to suit himself.'6 The first version was published in 1949 and
although there have been numerous and extensive revisions since then,"
the sales article and the all-important introductory article (Article 1)
retain most of the characteristics built into them by Llewellyn.
These are facts both awesome and immense. Llewellyn's thought
is central to the sales article. Sales law together with the laws of
negotiable instruments and bank collections, documents of title, letters
of credit and secured transactions most assuredly occupy much of the
area we call commercial law. Commercial transactions account for an
overwhelming number of contracts in any industrial nation.'8 Outside
16. Llewellyn and Professor Soia Mentschikoff were the reporter and assistant
reporter on the Uniform Revised Sales Act which was the first major subdivision of
the proposed Code. Later they became chief reporter and associate chief reporter for
the whole Code. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958). Llewellyn's influence was particularly strong during
the early drafting stages, and even after industry and government groups became
pointedly interested in the project around 1952 and participated heavily in the actual
drafting thereafter, Llewellyn was able to hold much of the alteration to language
changes. The substructure of the Code as initially drafted under the guidance of Karl
Llewellyn remains unchanged despite a certain destruction of its original "unity."
Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962). Llewellyn
himself did not make such claims for his part in the work on the Code. Llewellyn,
Why We Need The Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. Rtv. 376 (1957).
17. The version referred to in this essay as the current one is UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 Official Text With Comments (1962), and at other places
herein reference is made to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, May 1949 Draft (1949)
as "the 1949 version." All the versions are officially cited in Braucher, The Legisla-
tive History of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 16, at 798 n.1.
18. One may assess the jurisprudential significance of the different types of
contracts (including their number and dollar value) made annually in this country in
any manner he chooses, but it would seem that any fair appraisal of the matter would
have to acknowledge that the contract for sale of goods is clearly the predominant
form of economic transfer in this country today. Of our Gross National Product for
1964 $399.2 billions were exchanged as "personal consumption expenditures" and
$35.1 billions for "producer's durable equipment." We expended $308.9 billions for
"goods" and $244.4 billions for "services" plus $68.9 for "construction," most of it by
means of sales contracts. Personal consumption expenditures of $399.2 billions went
for $57 billions in "durable goods," $177.1 billions in nondurable goods, and $165.1
billions for "services." From another perspective - also encompassed in the Uniform
Commercial Code - total sales in manufacturing and trade were $72,634 millions plus
$107,995 millions in inventories. At the respective distributive levels in our economy
there were $37,100 millions in manufacturing sales, $13,734 millions in sales by whole-
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the Uniform Commercial Code there remains only sales of land, pure
personal service contracts, insurance and sales of securities on the
exchanges, plus a few other odds and ends of commercial contract-
ing transactions.
Professor Williston seized the strategic ground of American con-
tract law when he drafted the Uniform Sales Act and went on to publish
his monumental Restatement of Contracts. Karl Llewellyn has now
captured the high ground by means of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The burden of this monograph is that Professor Karl Llewellyn
implemented his ideas on the law of contract by imbedding them into
the Uniform Commercial Code in such manner that they are now
virtually inextricable. More importantly, he built the Code so as to
embody a commercial contract construct substantially different from
the orthodox contract construct by statutorily substituting obligation-
based-on-transaction for obligation-based-on-promise. This theory is
fascinatingly persuasive for those like myself, who had long wondered
what fine madness underlay the plethora of contract rule changes
wrought by the Code.
nI.
FROM PROMISE TO AGREEMENT AND A BIT BEYOND
The concept of "promise" was and is of critical importance to
traditional contract law, but the word seldom appears in the Code.
This alone marks a significant departure from the nomenclature of
the law of contract. Relying completely on the mental picture of face-
to-face dealing by means of personal "promises," the Restatement of
Contracts repeatedly uses the term as virtually synonymous with
"contract" or "undertaking," a combination of acts and "intangible
duties" or "the moral duty" to perform. Since it is the ultimate fact
in traditional contract law it cannot be defined in concrete terms because
it signifies a mixture of fact and law. 9
salers, and $21,000 millions in retail trade - inventory values at each level were
approximately the same as sales except that manufacturers had nearly twice as much
value in inventories as they handled in sales. Economic Report of The President
(1965). My point is that two-thirds of all contracting (measured in dollars) in this
country in 1964 involved sales of goods or equipment. The law of sales is of obvious
strategic importance to this tremendous amount of economic activity.
19. RzSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 1 (1932), defines "contract" as "a promise or
set of promises," and comment b advises:
As the term is used in the Restatement of this Subject, 'contract' includes not
only the act of making a promise or promises but the intangible duties which arise.
Similarly 'promise,' under the definition in § 2, includes not merely the act of
speaking, but the continuous duty, whether moral or legal, which a promisor
assumes when he makes a promise. The separation is not made in ordinary legal
speech, and is not made in the Restatement of this Subject, between the physical
act of speaking words of promise and the intangible duties which thereupon arise.
[VOL. 11 : p. 213
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The validity of the entire Langdell-Williston-Restatement con-
struct was briskly challenged by Llewellyn in 1937. Announcing his
deliberate intention to recanvass the field of contract law in a series
of studies, Llewellyn gave as his explanation for this monumental task
he was undertaking that Orthodoxy's formulations were suspect. He
threw down the gauntlet without equivocation:
The impulse and analysis of Langdell, the further development
and clarification of Williston, the caseless Restatement of the Law
of Contract: These seem to me at clear variance with both the
decisions and with sense, on too many points for comfort. The
five volumes of Williston and Thompson which I have thus far
read contain, to my reading, a desperate, though often skillful,
effort to make non-law look like law.2"
His grand design was to present rules of law instead of formulae of
superstitution about law and he proposed to rely heavily on the prior
work of Professor Arthur Corbin, his father-in-law.
One can only suppose the virtual omission of "promise" from the
Code was a deliberate and calculated effort to free contract from an in-
defensible image and an undefinable foundation word. The third episode
of his projected recanvassing of the law of contract took up this precise
point in a passage where he noted that "the traditional base-line of a
century back" is that "the essential basis of contracting is Agreement."
Our judges are prone to keep confused the difference between law
and fact, he noted, but no matter what the particular word-formula-
tion they used to describe "contract":
[T]he operative facts were to be facts of agreement. Into this line
of thinking broke the line of thinking in terms of a contract as
involving not agreement in first instance, but promise - or 'a set
of promises.' This the Restatement accepts. But the Restatement
still stands firm in further keeping law fused with fact: a contract
'is a promise (or a set of promises) legally enforceable.' Corbin's
sounder and keener insight on this latter point the Restatement
rejected.
2 1
This complex formulation is continued in section 2 which defines "promise" as "an
undertaking" and comment a notes that "just as 'contract' . . . means both physical
manifestations by words or acts of assurance and the moral duty to make good the
assurance by performance. .. ."
20. Llewellyn, The Rule Of Law In Our Case-Law, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1269
(1938). Corbin's basic definition of "promise" went thus: "A promise is an expression
of intention that the promisor will conduct himself in a specified way in the future,
with an invitation to the promisee to rely thereon." Corbin, Offer And Acceptance
and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 171 (1917) ; CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 13 (1952). Although in the latter publication he proposes that his
definition and that used by the Restatement are "not substantially in conflict," there
is clearly the difference between the two that Corbin is talking about physical facts
while Williston is using the word "promise" to signify physical facts and "intangible
duties" moral or legal.
21. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance 11, 48 YALE
L.J. 779, 796-97 (1939).
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The vice in the Restatement notion of "promise" as the cornerstone
of a general theory of contract is that "when you see that there just
has to be a contract ... you will 'see' or 'find' a 'promise' where there
is no promise ... [and] if you still believe that you must find a second
promise in order to establish a mutual contract ... then even when you
have a very clear and satisfactory expression of agreement you are
likely not to see it." 2
For one who thinks in traditional contract images it would be
virtually impossible to codify the immense body of contractual rules
structuring commercial transactions without some reference to the key
"operative act" of the Langdell-Williston-Restatement construct. But
for one thinking in functional images, knowledgeable of the enormous
diversity of commercial contracting practices, and impressed with the
"life situations" of business transactions it would be unthinkable to
ground contract rules on a spurious fact basis which seldom occurs in the
manner suggested by the normal connotations of the word "promise."
Nor does the phrase "mutual assent" quite fill the bill. Crippled
permanently by the legal theological battles over "subjective" versus
"objective" tests, encrusted with the barnacles of "meeting of the
minds" problems and rife with the promissory connotations of the
word "assent," use of the mutual assent 'litany would augur confusion
further compounded. The phrase has always carried the distressing
implication that there was a single proposition to which the contract-
ing parties humbly acquiesced, a proposition existing completely ex-
traneous to the parties and their transactions, stemming, perhaps, from
a deus ex machina who broadcast propositions to the cosmos at ran-
dom to be examined and accepted by parties who were looking around
for propositions to assent to. Something much more realistic, com-
prehensive and cleanly factual than either "promise" or "mutual assent"
was required. The older history of contract law emphasizes "pact."
Even the old English writ-word "assumpsit" was not quite so narrow
as "promise" but instead was more accurately the act of "undertaking."
Resort by the Code to the older word "agreement" was thus both a re-
turn to the original understanding of the essence of contract obligation
and a more concrete reference to contemporary commercial transactions.
This substitution of terminology was certainly not inadvertent as
evidenced by the following passage written by Llewellyn just before
he began work on the Code:
The common experience observation that most business deals are
initiated by various means of expressions of agreement, both
22. Ibid.
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words and acts, gives power to the century-old approach of courts
to contract as resting simply in overt agreement . . . [and] since
it is true that expression of agreement is the normal and natural
way of closing a deal, the legal mind is tempted to conclude that
it may be the only way of closing one. Hence, even as doctrinal
emphasis shifted from agreement to promise as being the essential
subject-matter of Contract, agreement was yet dragged along,
as a secondary essential attribute, and was called for in the require-
ment of 'mutual assent.' It will be noted that the change in term
carries a change in flavor. 'Agreement' connotes active obliga-
tion; and connotes overt expression. 'Assent' need not; its actual
flavor is satisfied by mere acquiescence, in silence. This leaves the
obligation aspect of the agreement-idea free to center on, and to
become obscured by, the term 'promise.'1
2
Rereading these passages one is struck by the enormous implications
of the ostensibly insignificant insistence in the Code on "agreement"
rather than "promise." The burden of that entire law review article
was that the great dichotomy drawn by orthodox contract law between
bilateral and unilateral contracts was utterly meaningless when tested
by the fact patterns of common experience. Grounding contract on
agreement-in-fact, however manifested, the Code wipes out with one
sweep the whole figment of promise-for-a-promise-or-promise-for-an-
act. Llewellyn proposed at that point in his thinking not so much a
massive conceptual shift away from something called "promise" to
something called "agreement," but more nearly a broader conceptual
base for contract, unified by removal of the false dichotomy between
promises and acts of acceptance dictated by Orthodoxy's emphasis on
"promise," and a more commonsense "single approach to acceptance
for business deals" in meeting the functional problems arising from
the initiation of business transactions. In other words, the making of
business contracts should be viewed by the law as involving not only
the exchange of factual promises or the tendering of unverbalized ac-
quiescence, but, more realistically, as the commencement of a continuing
process of agreement in the broader, more familiar sense.
That he still had this in mind when he fashioned the Code can-
not be doubted when the introductory article itself is consulted. The
1949 version appeared almost exactly ten years after Llewellyn wrote
the essay cited above, and it is both plausible and persuasive that in
the meantime he had concluded that promise was a false god for the
law of commercial contract. Section 1-201 (10) of the 1949 Code
defines "contract" as "the total obligation in law which results from
the parties' agreement...." The key fact underlying the legal obliga-
23. Id. at 809.
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tions of the contracting parties is their "agreement" which was defined
in subsection (2) as "the bargain in fact as found in the language of
the parties or in course of dealing or usage of trade or course of per-
formance or by implication from other circumstances." These defini-
tions and their comments are carried over unmodified in the 1962
Code, with the exception that the current version of "agreement" has
rearranged the phrases of the crucial first sentence so as to alter the
original formulation slightly. The 1962 definition provides:
(3) 'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found
in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance. . . . (section 1-201 (3))
There is the implication that under the original definition of agree-
ment a contract obligation could be founded upon: 1) language of the
parties, or 2) course of dealing, or 3) usage of trade, or 4) course of
performance, or 5) other circumstances; but that the 1962 definition
eliminates the fifth basis and through phraseological rearrangement
creates a series of possibilities for contract obligations arising from:
1) language of the parties, or
2) other circumstances provided in the act, including [but not
limited to?]
a) course of dealing, or
b) usage of trade, or
c) course of performance.
This does not seem to modify the basic meaning of the original 1949
language. Even more importantly, this key definition substantially
reflects Llewellyn's meaning of obligation-based-on-transaction and
manifests his deliberate intention to effect the precise alterations in the
contract construct he urged in 1939.
This point can be traced still further in the Code. Both the 1949
and the current versions of the Code irrevocably structure the agree-
ment-in-fact idea into the law of sales contracts by providing in section
2-204 that "a contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement," including conduct by the parties recog-
nizing the existence of a contract. The secured transactions article
provides that "a security interest cannot attach until there is agree-
ment," citing specifically to the agreement definition of Article 1. This
same "agreement" definition also is imported into the letters of credit
[VOL. 11: p. 213
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article where the issuer's obligation to its customer is set forth in sec-
tion 5-109. The statutory text specifies that the issuer is ordinarily not
responsible for the underlying contracts of the customer and beneficiary,
nor for any act or omission by anyone else, nor for its own lack of knowl-
edge of trade usages other than banking usage. But the more illuminat-
ing aspect of this section appears in comment 1, which states:
The extent of the issuer's obligation to its customer is based upon
the agreement between the two. Like all agreements within the
Code that agreement is the bargain of the parties in fact as defined
in Section 1-201 (3) ... and includes the obligation of good faith
imposed by Section 1-203 and the observance of any course of deal-
ing or usage of trade made applicable by Section 1-205.
A forward reference to Part IV of this essay serves to emphasize the
essential unity of Llewellyn's thought as manifested in the Code, for
in the Code section quoted above the two baselines of Agreement and
Commercial Good Faith are explicitly linked.
These examples not only echo the theme of section 1-201 (3) that
a broader jurisprudential base than promise has been laid for the law
of sales, letters of credit, and secured transactions; but a more notice-
able and more important fact is that the seeming multitude of changes
in particular traditional rules of contract law gain new significance by
reference to the Code emphasis on obligation-based-on-agreement-in-
fact. Viewed in the polarized light of Llewellyn's attitudes concern-
ing orthodox contract law, this return by the Code to older and more
realistic ideas lends significance to the rule changes which loom forth
from the dry-as-dust statutory language of our new commercial law.
III.
A TRANSACTIONAL CONSTRUCT
The salient feature of commercial law in this country is its neces-
sary relationship to our goods distribution system. That economic
system requires rules for the sale, shipment and storage of the goods
themselves, and also ' demands rules for the necessary supporting
activities - payment and financing. The English Sales of Goods Act
and Bills of Exchange Act were formulated for a distribution system
so rudimentary that by the time they were copied in our Uniform Sales
Act and Negotiable Instruments Law the whole body of those laws was
hopelessly uncorrelated with our economic distribution system.
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The Code takes a fresh start and is framed around our present
goods distribution system. This shows up clearly when the two are
considered together. The "baseline" here being considered is a bit
more difficult to describe although possibly even more significant: than
the agreement parameter. That Karl Llewellyn was concerned because
the orthodox offer-acceptance-consideration construct was predicated
on a static, unrealistic conception of 18th century face-to-face com-
mercial exchanges, is manifested in many of his published expressions.
The closing stanza of his monumental two-part study of the law of
sales warranty in 1937 alludes to the increasing prevalence of the
commercial phenomenon of the "continuing transaction" which our law
of contract regards in helpless amazement. He noted:
Consider, for instance, the queer rules which courts indulge, sever-
ing each contract between two parties from each other contract
e.g., in regard to whether buyer's default on one excuses seller's
performance on 'another.' No businessman or credit department
could think that way: what they see is 'an account' in arrears, on
certain 'items.' The law has, thus far, failed to come close to
perception of these standing relations, and has failed to develop
tools to pick them up or deal with them. 4
Attempting to summarize some of the legal aspects of this settled
commercial practice, he noted the need for open terms in contracts, a
commercial (substantial) performance doctrine in place of the legal
(strict) performance standard in sales, a "less-than-full-contract-
damage" sanction for binding going-relation arrangements, and frank
recognition that what may be "good policy" in goods-distributing
relations might be intolerable in labor-relations. Thirty years ago he
noted, "that sales law is already being affected by going-relations, of
one sort or another, in ways which flout old contract and sales theory.""
He particularly criticized the Uniform Sales Act remedy of out-
right rescission for defects in quality, pointing out that real functional
differences to dealers between "gradable goods," durable goods, heavy
machinery, and soft goods could, without trauma, translate into legal
differences concerning remedies for defects in quality. Following up
that notion he noted that: "until our economy shifts its entire base,
deals between merchants will be first of all deals, looking toward move-
ment of goods and toward accounts in due course to be taken care of."'26
24. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, And Society: II, 37 COLUm. L. Riv. 341,
376-77 (1937).
25. Id. at 379.
26. Id. at 389.
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Perhaps a fuller statement of the type of relationship he perceived
between the legal notion of contract, goods distribution and the needs
of our credit economy appeared in 1931 in an article prepared for the
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences in which he said:
Bargain is then the social and legal machinery appropriate to
arranging affairs in any specialized economy which relies on
exchange rather than tradition (the manor) or authority (the
army, the U.S.S.R.) for apportionment of productive energy and
of product. It is a machinery which like statute but in contrast
to tort makes it easy to insist on positive affirmative action.
Contract in the strict sense is the specifically legal machinery
appropriate when such an economy moves into the phase of credit
meaning or connoting thereby future dealings in general; in which
aspect the mutual reliance of two dealers on their respective
promises comes of course into major importance. This machinery
of contract applies in general to the market for land, goods, ser-
vices, credit, or for any combination of these. . . . Output and
requirement contracts, maximum and minimum contracts, con-
tracts with quality, quantity and kinds to be specified from month
to month, and sliding scale price arrangements - these are
symptomatic of an economy stabilizing itself along new lines.
2 7
His primary points were well made: A modern commercial law
of business contracts must be rooted in the actual fact patterns of our
modern, credit-oriented, on-going transactional economic system which
now distributes $620 billion worth of goods and services annually.
The Uniform Commercial Code has such vision, and in its very essence
differs dramatically from the title-exchange construct against which
orthodox contract law framed its principles governing the sale of goods.
The Code sees an altogether different commercial world.
But the best evidence of the extent to which the Code is geared to
dynamic, flowing, on-going commercial process is the fact that the
very warp and woof of the Code itself testifies to the fact. For a point
of beginning visualize the general goods distribution process in this
country today by means of an ideograph symbolizing the essential
economic functions together with the various articles of the Code.
Mine looks something like this:
27. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 717 (1931). The
significance of the notion of the "credit economy" which appears in the quoted extract
is further developed in the passage beginning on page 708 where he notes that contract
begins "in a society in which bargains and promises are as rare as are some hundred
other matters of our present daily life" and thus things to be regarded with suspicion,
but "the other end of the development lies in a credit economy in which bargains and
promises are so much the normal course of dealing that reliance on them is a matter
of tacit presupposition . . . [and] the legal approach then is, fundamentally: a bargain
or promise is enforceable unless reason appears to the contrary." Id. at 710.
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Goods or choses in action flow downward from the producer through
the wholesaler, retailer and ultimately to the consumer. The rules for
sales in article 2 and those for documents of title in article 7 regulate
this down-flowing pattern which is the basic distribution process in
our economy. In any given transaction one or more of the two middle
economic steps of distribution may not have yet fully developed into
independent stages or may have been absorbed through corporate
vertical integration but the respective economic functions must still be
perfomed irrespective of who does it. Money in the payment process
flows upward along the right hand margin of the diagram from each
lower stage to a higher distributive stage through commercial banking
channels. The whole process is covered by the negotiable instruments
rules of article 3 and the bank collection rules of article 4. Our interim
or short-to-medium term financing process is depicted along the left
margin and consists of creditors who loan money to either party to the
goods exchange by means of promissory notes covered by article 3 or
issuance of letters of credit under article 5 and who obtain security
interests in the goods themselves (or in documents representing the
goods or instruments which have been exchanged for the goods) under
the secured transactions provisions of article 9, or by means of inven-
tory protection afforded some unsecured lenders under the fraudulent
conveyances rules of article 6.
This diagram depicts the overall makeup of the Code. Internally,
the various articles of the Code are correlated with the essential
processes of the functional goods-distribution model which thus pro-
vides an essential unifying feature for the whole Code. There are
millions of contractual "working parts" in the model. They mesh more
or less smoothly, continuously, flexibly and adjustably to distribute
many thousands of different products by means freely chosen and rea-
sonably adapted to commercial needs. The Russians have nothing
quite like it.
2 8
28. The R.S.F.S.R. CrVIL CODE of 1922 was drafted by Soviet jurists who were
trained prior to the revolution and whose thinking reflected much of the German Civil
Code which was both a model for the Soviets and many provisions of which were
virtually copied. The black-letter law of Soviet contracts thus contained basic pro-
visions dealing with the formation, performance and breach of a contract and re-
sembled traditional European legal thinking. At the same time it also manifested the
NEP policies against recognition of private rights. The new Fundamental Principles
of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, adopted in 1961, proceeds
upon the assumption that private contract plays a small role in a communist society.
The emphasis is on regulating the relationships among public agencies and with
private individuals. HAZARD & SHAPIRO, THE Sovi~r LEGAL SySTEM, PARKER SCHOOL
STUDIES IN FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, Part III, 28 (1962).
Perhaps a clearer indication of the precise role played by contract in a com-
munist society is the following description of the centrally-developed economic
"plan" mechanism:
The plan holds a central position in the East German economy. It expresses the
governmental economic policy and fixes, with the help of binding directives, the
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A similar analysis of the key articles themselves reveals a repeti.
tion of functional arrangement based closely upon the settled fact-
patterns of commercial practice in the particular field of activity. These
key articles cover sales, negotiable instruments, bank collections and
secured transactions - articles 2, 3, 4 and 9. Only a sketchy discussion
of the respective processes will be reproduced here in an attempt to
minimize reader boredom. Yet it should be apparent immediately that
upon the whited bones of these frames grow the living sinews of the
Code rules. The basic parameter for each Code article is the typical
chronological sequence of the particular commercial process involved.
A. Sales Law
The Sales Construct is a two-party model which embodies the basic
sales processes of "contracting," "delivery," "acceptance," "breach"
and "remedies." This feature has been elliptically noted by many com-
mentators. Professor Mentschikoff, in her recent discussion of the
Code, sketches through the arrangement of the parts in the sales
article.2" We are all familiar with the functional disorganization of the
old Uniform Sales Act which was vaguely arranged along contract con-
cept lines. The Code remedies that particular blemish in our commercial
law and takes a functionally-oriented approach to do so by proceeding
through the typical sales transaction systematically from contracting
to performance to lawsuit. This is life.
Wedded to the functional sales construct are major changes relat-
ing to legal concepts of "contracting." More than mere rules changes,
these alterations signify a clear rejection of the traditional construct
and reinforce the shift from promise to agreement.
Orthodoxy's darling - the great contract dichotomy of bilaterals
and unilaterals - has been deftly erased from the law of sales for all
practical purposes by the provisions relating to offer and acceptance.
The Code provides:
1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances
course of the country's economic development. The function of contract, in turn,
is to implement in detail the directives of governmental policy as expressed in
the plan. The introduction of the system of contracts is designed to eliminate
from the plan those specifications which are important only between a particular
purchaser and a particular seller, as, for instance, the precise date of delivery, or
the particular type, quality and packaging of the goods. Moreover, the contract
serves as a means for disclosing mistakes and errors in the general planning and
permitting their correction.
Grossfeld, Money Sanctions For Breach of Contract In A Communist Economy, 72
YALE L.J. 1326, 1327-28 (1963).29. Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MoD. L. Rev.
167, 172 (1964).
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a) An offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
in the circumstances;
b) current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance
either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or
current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods
but such a shipment of nonconforming goods does not con-
stitute an acceptance if the seller reasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommoda-
tion to the buyer.
2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reason-
able mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of
acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as
having lapsed before acceptance (section 2-206).
The comments to this section make clear that "any reasonable manner
of acceptance is intended to be regarded as available unless the offeror
has made quite clear" that it will not, that either shipment or a promise
by the offeree initiates the deal in law, and the beginning of perform-
ance plus notice thereof to the offeror makes the contract. The "Ribbon
Matching" law of contract stems directly from the rigorous concep-
tualism of offer-acceptance, and Orthodoxy has always demanded that
both the content and mode of the acceptance correlate one-to-one with
the content and mode of the offer. This absurdity has now dis-
appeared from commercial law. Moreover, comment 4 states that
under subsection 1 (b) a shipment of nonconforming goods may amount
to an acceptance "intended to close the bargain, even though it proves
to have been at the same time a breach." One schooled in Orthodoxy
cannot imagine how such a thing could happen;3O but to the func-
tionally-oriented visionary it is all quite simple.
Inexorably eradicating old doctrine root and branch, the Code
settles the "battle of the forms" by providing in section 2-207 that
express acceptance varying the terms of the offer amounts not to a
conceptual counteroffer but instead "operates as an acceptance," unless
designated to be conditional upon assent by the offeror, whereupon
any such additional terms will normally become a part of merchants'
contracts unless the offer specifies otherwise, the additional terms
materially alter the contract or express objection to them is promptly
given. Comment 2 specifies that "a proposed deal which in commercial
understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract."
30. "How a nonconforming shipment can be both an acceptance and a breach I
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These two provisions substantially implement the "single approach
to business contracting" advocated by Llewellyn in 1939 and wipe
out Orthodoxy's great dichotomy in the field of sales contracts. 31
The hoary old consideration doctrine is treated almost as harshly.
Mercantile offers in writing may be irrevocable for ninety days with-
out being "supported" by consideration because the business practice
of contracting for goods both needs and utilizes the firm offer in writ-
ing identified as such.82 Llewellyn noted this many years ago. But a
more graphic affront to the consideration doctrine is contained in the
blunt statement of section 2-209(1) that "an agreement modifying a
contract within this article needs no consideration to be binding," and
subsection (4) will permit many abortive modification agreements to
"operate as a waiver." The comments clearly indicate that a require-
ment of consideration for such modification agreements would be mere
"technicality." Alas, once-mighty legal doctrine is humbled by mere
business expediency!
Numerous other specific changes in the Restatement and sales
rules are made throughout the body of article 2, some large and
some small, but all significant. Perhaps the most dramatic change
in the property aspect of sales law is the substantial elimination of the
title concept from the Code. "When title passed, title passed, and we
could all go home," is the wonderful statement coined by some unsung
genius of the law which summarized most of the old law of sales.
83
31. The dichotomy is meaningful in some limited instances and thus is retained
in the article 9 distinction between "account" and "contract right" in section 9-106.
Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1962 ILL. L.F. 321, 329.
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205.
33. When I first wrote this sentence I had not the foggiest notion who coined
that wonderful phrase nor where I first heard it. To my delight I later found that
my colleague Professor Fred Whiteside is "that unsung genius of the law." Whiteside,
Uniform Commercial Code - Major Changes in Sales Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 165, 173
(1960). It has a true Llewellynesque flavor. Llewellyn made known his general
views on the subject almost 30 years ago. Llewellyn, Through Title To Contract
And a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L. RZv. 159 (1938), 3 LAW - A CENTURY OF PROGRESS
80 (1937). His recommendations on the subject were essentially pragmatic:
I do not suggest the elimination of the title-concept. It has its uses. But it should
be made to serve merely as the general residuary clause.
Id at 88. Each of the suggestions for change voiced in that essay were reproduced
with fidelity in article 2. Section 2-401 provides:
Each provision of this article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies
of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of
title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title .... (1) ... title
to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions
explicitly agreed on by the parties.
The comment spells out that a new "step by step performance or non-performance"
approach to legal consequences is substituted for the title-passage idea. Some specific
examples are: risk of loss (§§ 2-509, 510), the seller's right to the price (§ 2-709),
and buyer's right to the goods (§§ 2-502, 2-716) are determined independently of the
location of "title"; and, section 2-401 is the "residuary clause" of which Llewellyn
wrote in 1937. But see Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code,
17 U. CHI. L. REv. 457 (1950), for some complaints that title sneaked back into the
Code in the "acceptance" provisions.
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There are many other contract rule changes in the sales article.3
4
Significant ones concern warranty,8 5 remedies,86  and quasi-reme-
34. A thorough recent survey of some of the many minor rule changes is Gilbride,
The UCC: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 177 (1964).
35. The contract doctrine of "privity" has been violated to the point where its
continuing integrity is questionable. "Horizontal" extension of a buyer's substantive
rights to enforce warranties has been widened to include "any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reason-
able to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods" by
section 2-318. The section caption indicates a "third-party beneficiary contract"
theory was adopted in order to abrogate the privity requirement as to persons in the
designated class. See also comment 2. However, comment 3 invites judicial examina-
tion of further case-law extension of warranty protection "to other persons in the
distributive chain." These different theories are not necessarily inconsistent with each
other, but the former ties subsequent development of warranty extension to a tra-
ditional contract concept while the latter invites reformulation of the field along more
functional lines. Quick reference to &STATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 133 through 147,
reveals that possible third-party beneficiaries must fall within the category of "donee,"
"creditor," "incidental" or a beneficiary of a public contract, duty depending upon
the "intent" of the contracting parties. Consulting case law development since 1932,
one discovers that the Restatement approach predominates. Colonial Discount, Inc. v.
Avon Motors, Inc., 137 Conn. 196, 75 A.2d 507 (1950) ; Ridder v. Blethen, 166 P.2d
834 (Wash. 1946). The decisions relating to construction contracts involving a bond-
ing company, prime contractor and subcontractor contain no clearly enunciated third-
party beneficiary contract theory which would permit extension of warranty protec-
tion under UCC § 2-318 to other persons in the distributive chain, for example,
employees of the buyer. The bartender in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa.
610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), was not entitled to recover for injuries from the exploding
bottle because he was not a "subpurchaser," so abrogation of the strict privity require-
ment by previous Pennsylvania decisions did not aid him despite UCC § 2-318. The
dishwasher in Duart v. Axton-Cross Co., 199 Conn. Sup. 188, 110 A.2d 647 (1954),
could not recover for her skin infection caused by defective soap because employees
were not named as members of the statutory class to whom warranty protection was
extended. But see Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964),
noted in 10 VILL. L. Rgv. 607 (1965).
"Vertical" problems of procedure raised by the privity requirement of traditional
contract law invariably appear in cases involving attempts by consumers to sue manu-
facturers directly for breach of warranty.
These problems have been judicially approached on a number of different theories.
BRAUCHER & SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 20 (3d ed. 1964) (enumerating
six separate theories invoked to permit suit directly against the manufacturer) ; Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962)
(advancing a theory grounded on misrepresentation by advertising). The UCC
mechanism for curing these problems does some violence to the privity concept. Under
the vouching-in provisions of section 2-607(5), a buyer being sued for breach of
warranty "for which his seller is answerable over" may notify his seller to "come in
and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any action against
him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations."
Note, A Comparison of Rights and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers Under the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Sales Act, 49 Ky. L.J. 270 (1960);
Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under War-
ranty Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1960); Note, Legislation, 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 331 (1954).
36. Two casualties are "rescission' of the contract and the doctrine of "election
of remedies," both of which were grounded ultimately on principles of contract law.
The latter concept is most explicitly rejected by the Code. Section 2-703 enumerates
the seller's remedies and comment 1 states:
This article rejects any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy
and thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature and include all of the
available remedies for breach. Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another
depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.
Although election of remedies is neither a fundamental policy nor a millstone around
the seller's neck, its ghost may still crop up in the context of the buyer's remedies.
Section 2-711 enumerates the buyer's remedies and comment 1 states they are "avail-
able to a buyer who has not accepted the goods or who has justifiably revoked
his acceptance."
The remedies available to a buyer with regard to goods finally accepted appear in
the section dealing with breach in regard to accepted goods. The remedies available
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dies."7 Arguably, the "quasi-remedies" represent the substantial per-
formance and less-than-full-contract-damage principles Llewellyn cried
out for many years ago.
Particular modifications in contract law are apparently miniscule
but have enormous significance when viewed in the light of the sug-
gested jurisprudential shift from contract back to (economic) status.
Thus the "open terms" provisions of the Code strike at the heart of the
orthodox indefiniteness doctrine of ancient vintage by expressly validat-
ing contracts which specify neither price, place of delivery, time of
delivery nor time of performance. Only the total quantity must be
definite although the assortment need not.88 Section 2-204(3) sets
to a buyer for breach regarding accepted goods are cross-indexed as the right to
demand "cure" under section 2-508, the right to accept and reject on a "commercial
unit" basis under section 2-601 (c), the right to revoke acceptance under section 2-608,
the right to reject a non-conforming installment or cancel under section 2-612, and his
right to recover damages under section 2-714. Thus the buyer "elects" among these
two sets of "remedies" by accepting the goods under section 2-606.
The wondrous mysteries of "rescission" similarly are a thing of the past in sales
law. There were three distinct meanings for "rescission" under prior sales law:
1) some breaches of installment contracts justified the seller refusing to continue
performance and suing for damages for breach of the entire contract under section
45(2) of the Uniform Sales Act, which some courts called "rescission"; 2) section 61
permitted a seller to "rescind the transfer of title" and sue for damages; and 3) sec-
tion 65 permitted a seller to "totally rescind the contract or the sale" whereupon he
retained no rights "on the contract" under general contract law principles. BRAUCH1R
& SUTHIXRLAND, COMM4RCIAL TRANSACTIONS 163 (3d ed. 1964). A buyer could
"rescind" the contract of sale under section 69(1) (d) for a breach of warranty and
occasionally for some other breach under general contract law. Note, A Comparison
of the Rights and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers Under the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Sales Act, supra note 34, at 285. The Code nowhere specifies
that either party can "rescind" although they may "cancel." Section 2-703(f) (seller)
and section 2-711(1) (buyer). Cancellation merely discharges obligations of per-
formance by either party. The only mention of "rescission" is in section 2-720 to the
effect that any such expression by either party shall not be deemed to constitute
renunciation or discharge of any claim for damages for antecedent breach.
The most exhaustive study of the Code changes in specific sales remedies is Peters,
Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to The Sale of Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALF L.J. 199 (1963).
37. The descriptive phrase "quasi remedies" is borrowed from my former col-
league Professor Frederic Spies of the University of Arkansas School of Law.
Intended to signify those sales article innovations which do not quite come within the
fair meaning of the word "remedies" because they are not the traditional legal
remedies of the law of sales, this phrase includes the provisions dealing with uncon-
scionable contracts (section 2-302), modification without consideration (section 2-209),
right to preserve goods in dispute (section 2-515), right to adequate assurance of
performance (sections 2-609 to 2-619), anticipatory repudiation (sections 2-610 and
2-611), rights upon destruction of goods (section 2-613), substituted performance
(section 2-614), excuse by failure of presupposed conditions (section 2-615), cure
(section 2-508), and right to cash or to stop goods upon buyer's insolvency (sections
2-702 and 2-502). The essence of this classification is that these rights, duties and
liabilities accrue in the absence of full contract breach. Spies, Sales: Article II,
16 ARK. L. Riv. 6, 26-29 (1961). "Cure" is particularly useful against "bad faith
rejections of title" in certain situations and may compel re-examination of at least
two hoary old sales law homilies. Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender to Title
to Chattels: Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. Rgv. 697 (1962).
38. The "open terms" provisions are those designed to permit the court to fill the
gaps in the contract left by the parties: price (section 2-305), delivery (sections 2-307
and 2-308), and time (section 2-309). The text statement that "the total quantity
must be definite" is slightly exaggerated in one sense because the Statute of Frauds
provision, section 2-201, does not flatly require the quantity to be stated but instead
provides that "the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
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forth basic Code doctrine that such an open-term contract "does not fail
for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract" and
some appropriate remedy can be framed, and the comment to that pro-
vision notes that it "states the principle as to 'open terms' underlying
later sections of the article." More to the point, the open price term
provision rejects both the orthodox contract rule that "an agreement
to agree is unenforcible" and the whole "indefiniteness" doctrine on
grounds that ". . . where the dominant intention of the parties [is] to
have the deal continue to be binding on both.. ." the contract is valid.89
Functional approach to goods distribution, coupled with both
major doctrinal modifications and minor rules changes all compel the
conclusion that the sales article alterations are consistent with this
conspiracy theory of the Code.
B. Commercial Paper
Orthodox contract law branches out in another direction to con-
vert the personal contract into a "negotiable instrument." Emphasizing
the essential oneness in law of all such transferable contracts, our tradi-
tional approach has been simply to specify the requisites of "negoti-
ability," the rules for transferring these items and to construct rudi-
mentary channels for these transfers by means of status-creating con-
cepts such as "holder," "holder in due course," "holder not in due
course," and "bona fide purchaser." That was our negotiable instru-
ments law: fragmentary, vague and depressingly ritualistic. One mem-
orized the elements of negotiability, types of endorsements and the
stately patterns of British banking - presentment, acceptance, dis-
honor - in order to pass the bar exam. Generation after generation
of law students has been thoroughly drilled in the abstractions of
"value," "notice," "endorsement or assignment," "real versus personal
defenses," and the unanswerable complexities arising from the imper-
sonation cases.4° The whole of the commercial banking process was
quantity of goods shown in such writing." Another dimension to this matter is the
validation in section 2-306 of output, requirements and exclusive dealing contracts,
the orthodox objections to which have included their "indefiniteness" concerning
quantity and other standards of performance. Section 2-306 provides that an output
or requirements term means "such actual output or requirements as may occur in
good faith" and not "unreasonably disproportionate" to stated amounts or estimates
of normal or prior output or requirements; and, an exclusive dealing agreement
obligates the parties to "use best efforts" in performing, or, as comment 5 states it:
"to use reasonable diligence as well as good faith in their performance of the contract."
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-305, comment 1.
40. Most of these classroom patients are cured by particular provisions in article 3.
That great conundrum arising from whether a restrictive endorsement impaired
subsequent negotiability and the whole matter is restructured in sections 3-204, 3-205
and 3-206 (negotiability is not destroyed, a subsequent indorsee is not on "notice"
WINTER 1966]
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subsumed in a few ancient English cases on bills of exchange plus an
occasional lawsuit arising by virtue of fortuitous bank failures. Price
v. Neal served all comers. That all this was hopelessly uncorrelated
with commercial realities seemed to bother no one.
But for at least fifty years the commercial world has made a clear
and vital functional division of commercial paper into credit instru-
ments, secured debt instruments and securities. Whole industries have
grown up around these divisions, and completely different institutional
practices have been created in order to accommodate the economic-use
distinctions between the payment, financing and investment processes
in our economy.
The Code changes few black-letter rules of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. These rule changes have been often described and dis-
cussed but the most succinct description comes from Llewellyn himself:
On the side of Commercial Paper, the many case-law conflicts
have been cleared up, proceedings on dishonor simplified, obsolete
material like acceptance and payment 'for honor' eliminated, and
current paper separated from investment securities, with bonds,
share certificates and the like dealt with in a separate article. Bank
collection has, however, been included in Commercial Paper, with
new statutory regulation of the item-by-item collection typified by
the documentary draft, and with the float of 'cash items' (which
have long come to be handled in bulk) dealt with by new law....
Warehouse receipts and bills of lading are drawn together into
a separate article, with slightly expanded coverage; . . . . As a
corollary to coverage of the overseas sales transaction, there has
been coverage of its complements in banking practice, the letter of
credit and the foreign remittance ..."
These seemingly random changes not only tidy-up but also unmis-
takably alter the conceptual underpinnings of our law of commercial
merely because of the restrictive endorsement and may qualify as a holder in due
course). Section 3-305 clarifies much of the confusion of "real versus personal
defenses" by specifying which particular defenses are unavailable as against a holder
in due course (infancy, duress or illegality in the transaction, misrepresentation in
the inducement, discharge from insolvency proceedings, and any discharge of which
the holder has notice when he takes the instrument), and the comments further specify
that "all defenses" includes nondelivery, conditional delivery or delivery for a special
purpose (comments 2, 3 and 5). Comment 7 expressly accepts the case law distinc-
tion between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the factum. Impersonation problems
and "payroll padding" situations are covered in section 3-405 which tends to put the
loss in both instances on the drawer, thus permitting continued use of those particular
traumatic situations in the classroom to generate discussion about the "equities" of
the situation. Material alteration problems and the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr.
1354; 97 Eng. R. 871 (1762), are covered in sections 3-406, 3-407 and 3-418 which
define "material alteration" and provide for its legal consequences as to a mere holder
and a holder in due course, including the effect of negligence by a party. Payment
over stop orders is also affected by section 4-407 which subrogates a paying bank to
the drawer's rights on the original transaction.
41. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONT4MP. PROD.
687, 693 (1948).
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paper by functionally reframing the whole edifice to fit with current
socio-economic practices.
Where the Negotiable Instruments Law utilized contract principles
and a brand of commercial equity, the Code builds on an underlying
concept of the "market" for the various kinds of commercial paper.
Professor Mentschikoff describes the idea thus:
The underlying notion of this demarcation [of payment from in-
vestment paper] is that commercial paper such as bills of exchange,
notes, cheques, and the like should again become couriers without
luggage, and the classification of these pieces of paper as negoti-
able instruments should be dependent on commercial use and the
nature of the current markets to be protected. One obvious differ-
ence between investment and commercial paper markets is the effect
of maturity or default upon such paper and the purchasers of such
paper. Commercial paper under such circumstances is no longer
'current.' It has no market to protect. Investment paper, on the
other hand, continues to have a market which warrants protection.
2
Drafting the Code in light of this pragmatic view, articles 3 and 4
were framed against the actual and typical payment process and thus
specify the basic legal elements of the "items" (drafts and notes) and
their flow-system (the banking process of collection). Separated out
from this system altogether by articles 8 and 9 are the investment
process items, which can be described as "promissory" paper of a long-
term nature (securities) and short-term investment or "financing"
paper ("chattel paper" in article 9). Other points of distinction in-
volve bifurcation of the "negotiability" concept, typically differing
modes of transfer and protection of the basically different expectations
of purchasers of payment paper and purchasers of investment paper.
The commercial paper construct of the Code is thus predicated
largely on the typical payment process, and since drafts are today the
primary vehicle for transmission of payment values throughout our
economy that construct is most meaningfully revealed by tracing through
the check-payment provisions of articles 3 and 4. The resulting ideo-
graph manifests the functional bent of the Code concerning the vital
process of payment in our goods distribution system.
C. Secured Transactions
Article 9 is designed to set forth "a comprehensive scheme for
the regulation of security interests" to supplant the wide variety of
chattel security devices and fill the gaps between them. The basic
motivation was to cope with "the growing complexity of financing
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transactions" which cannot be effectively accommodated by our "com-
plicated nineteenth-century structure of security law."43 The compre-
hensiveness of article 9 generates complexity.
The secured transaction construct of the Code is a complex model.
Not only are there typically three chronological steps in the normal
security arrangement and four primary legal characteristics notable
in the process; but to make matters incomparably worse there are ten
different types of possible "collateral" with a galaxy of statutory pro-
visions applicable to some of the collateral all of the time and all the
collateral some of the time, but not to all the collateral all the time.
The three basic chronological steps common to all non-possessory
security arrangements (and to some possessory arrangements) are:
1) contracting or "attachment," 2) filing or "perfection"; and 3)
enforcement or "remedies." The ten different types of collateral can
be grouped into three classes: 1 ) consumer goods, farm products, equip-
ment and inventory can be called "goods"; 2) negotiable instruments,
documents of title and chattel paper can be called "paper"; and 3)
accounts, contract rights and general intangibles can be called "choses
in action." Each of the three groups contains types of collateral subject
generally to common sets of rules concerning priorities and remedies.
The construct can be most easily assimilated by diagramming it in the
form of a crossword puzzle.4 4
The outstanding doctrinal change characteristic of the article 9
impact on traditional contract law is the unitary approach to chattel
security. Contractual manipulation of title so as to effect legal conse-
quences has been as rigorously exorcised from article 9 as it has from
the sales article. Security-based-on-title has been replaced by security-
based-on-filed-contract for some collateral and security-based-on-posses-
sion for the remainder. The primary device for effecting security under
the Code is by means of the contractual creation of a single type of
security interest embodied in a single type of document filed under a
unified filing procedure. Differences in financing arrangements now
depend upon the nature of the collateral's use by the borrower and not
at all upon the conceptual type of title-manipulation-contract chosen by
the secured lender. Eradication of old legal nomenclature and the
coining of new and functionally-derived terminology serves to consoli-
date this drive to revamp the entire chattel security financing process.45
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODP § 9-101 comment.
44. Two attempts at simplification through diagramming are: Mooney, The Old
and the New - Article IX, 16 ARK. L. Rzv. 145, 160 (1961) ; and Goodwin, Secured
Transactions: Article IX, 16 ARK. L. liv. 131, 182-89 (1961), which presents an
altogether different diagrammatic approach.
45. No elaboration on the detailed rule changes, new concepts and terminology is
set forth here not only because it has been done elsewhere by others many times and
much better, but also because I have already done it elsewhere and do not wish to
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This marks a traumatic departure from traditional law in which legal-
istic contract form was pre-eminent.
Another significant doctrinal change is signalled by the article 9
provisions permitting free use of accounts, contract rights and general
intangibles as security." The common law experienced great difficulty
even conceiving a present transfer of choses in action and the transfer
of an inchoate chose in action was intellectually impossible. Con-
ceptually, traditional contract law could only bring itself to recognize
such transfers in Equity in the form of certain so-called "equitable
assignments." As students in Contracts I we all duly learned the
English Rule, the New York rule, and the Restatement or "hybrid"
rule reflecting the various attempts by contract law to work out the
rights of assignor, assignee and third parties. Notification statutes in
response to the Klauder case47 engrafted yet another set of problems
onto the matter; and Benedict v. Ratner s complicated the whole field
of accounts receivable financing with almost insuperable legal and prac-
tical problems. 49 Moreover, the conceptual inhibitions of assignment of
accounts was buttressed by the prevalence in many contracts of express
prohibitions against assignment. Article 9 cuts free from all this con-
ceptualistic underbrush by expressly incorporating into its scheme this
kind of collateral. To complete the whole doctrinal shift section 9-318
provides:
(4) A term in any contract between an account debtor and an
assignor which prohibits assignment of an account or contract right
to which they are parties is ineffective.
Comment 4 notes that for a hundred years our law has recognized
assignments of choses in action but there were still traces of the abso-
lute common law prohibition, and such cases as Alihusen v. Caristo
Const. Corp.50 continued to arise despite their affront to common-
sense, commercial needs and current decisions. The comment begins
and ends with the following remarks:
go through it again. Mooney, The Old and New: Article IX, 16 ARK. L. Rgv. 145
(1961). The secured transactions article makes "the most radical departure from
prior law." Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27 (1951).
46. Problems of financing on short-term receivables have been thoroughly ex-
plored in the many expositions on the Code which have appeared in the law reviews.
Only recently, however, have the problems of financing on long-term receivables begun
to be analyzed. Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious
Security, 74 YALx L.J. 217 (1964). And only a beginning has been made on the
matter of "general intangibles" as security. Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARv. L. Rtv. 997 (1964).
47. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
48. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
49. Gilmore, supra note 45, contains a brilliant and entertaining discussion of
these conceptual problems in what he calls "clearing away some underbrush." Id. at 221.
50. 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952).
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Subsection (4) breaks sharply with the older contract doctrines by
denying effectiveness to contractual terms prohibiting assignment
of accounts and contract rights ... it can be regarded as a revolu-
tionary departure only by those who still cherish the hope that we
may yet return to the views entertained some two hundred years
ago by the Court of King's Bench.
Further establishing that such a doctrinal break has occurred is the
provision in section 9-318 which permits the original parties to a con-
tract which has been assigned for security purposes to effect a good
faith modification of its terms, which "may do some violence to accepted
doctrines of contract law" but is deemed necessary "in view of the
realities of large scale procurement." 1
Code changes in the old law of chattel security are so sweeping
and drastic, and so well-documented by now, that no extended discus-
sion is required. The only meaningful way to view many of these rule
changes is transactionally, because article 9 was so obviously drafted
in light of the functional structure of modern financing practices.
Professor Mentschikoff identifies this theme by reference to the em-
phasis in article 9 on "current course financing" and the "on-going
nature of the transaction.
' 5 2
Many different aspects of the article attest to these characteristics.
Deliberate ruptures of old contract doctrine in order to permit accounts
receivable financing, assignment of contract rights and the "floating lien
on a shifting stock of goods," manifest it. Policy choices clearly favor-
ing the new loan, the incoming money and the facilitation of the move-
ment of goods and paper in ordinary course of trade, all reflect the
dynamic transactional construct upon which article 9 is based.
IV.
COURTS IN LEAGUE WITH COMMERCIAL DECENCY
Karl Llewellyn's first thoughts on the problem of implementing
a general obligation of good faith in commercial transactions was
to restore Lord Mansfield's merchant jury. The virtues of this device
were that the triers of fact would themselves be imbued with and
have the best understanding of what types of commercial conduct
met the prevailing standards of commercial good faith and fair dealing.
By means of this device, plus the fortuitous ascendance of strong
common law commercial judges, the law merchant first became in-
corporated into the common law. Such a decision-making mechanism
51. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COD& § 9-318, comment 2.
52. Mentschikoff, supra note 42, at 185.
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has the added feature of a built-in pipeline straight to the vital source
of commercial law, namely, the customs, practices and institutions of
the business society. Commercial law could thereby remain current,
alive and in contact with the world of commerce. This idea never bore
fruit, however, and does not appear in any of the published versions
of the Code.
His next approach was to impose the general obligation of good
faith performance on every contracting party and define good faith as
both "honesty-in-fact" and "observance of the reasonable commercial
standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged." The latter
element was excised by the American Bar Association's Section on
Corporation, Banking and Business Law by 1952, thereby destroying
the unitary concept of good faith performance applicable throughout
the Code."5
Perhaps in desperation, the present elaborate and fragmented
scheme embodying the good faith obligation was re-introduced into the
Code piecemeal. That pattern appears as a phrase in the text here, an
expanded comment there, and surreptitious cross-referencing back and
forth between definitions, substantive provisions and sections addressed
primarily to courts. Sadly enough it is problematical whether Llewellyn
was able to restore to health the fatally crippled general obligation of
good faith and commercial fair dealing.54 The courts may be able to
find one. Spelling out precisely how such an assertion may be estab-
lished by reference to the Code provisions themselves is a most difficult
exercise in Code-dialing. Yet it can be demonstrated to a fair degree
of persuasiveness that one more factor evidencing the massive juris-
prudential shift by the Code away from traditional contract principles
is its emphasis on a commercial good faith ground for judicial decision.
The general theory of contract grew up at Law and not in Equity.
Orthodox contract doctrine makes no meaningful differentiation among
contracting parties in terms of the roles they play in the economy.
Merchants are treated like everyone else. Generally speaking, our law
requires courts to enforce contracts as drawn by the parties absent
mental incompetence, fraud, deceit, mistake or when something called
"public policy" intervenes. In some circumstances the law will decline
to enforce a contract for a party who has disqualified himself from
receiving the aid of a court of Equity. Little leeway for "interpretation"
is provided a court by the offer-acceptance-consideration construct
53. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 666 673 (1963).
54. This seems to be generally accepted as the unfortunate truth by both Ment-
schikoff, supra note 42, and Farnsworth, supra note 53, and is probably true as far
as it goes. The assertion being made herein, however, is not quite the same. Tech-
nically speaking no general duty exists - jurisprudentially, good faith is a baseline.
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because it places maximum emphasis upon the express or fairly implied-
in-fact promises of the parties. Although frequently cited in judicial
opinions as makeweight, the notion of good faith and fair dealing is
almost never an explicit ground for decision in commercial contracts
cases. Decision is normally grounded explicitly on the orthodox con-
struct. The parol evidence rule, plain meaning rule and traditional
maxims of construction employed by courts to interpret contracts all
reinforce the notion of a rigorous doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. For
the most part only a rudimentary procedural mechanism is available for
general use by courts expressly to introduce into particular decisions
elements of good faith, minimum standards of fair dealing or equitable
considerations. These considerations come to prominence only in cases
calling for granting or administration of certain equitable remedies,
normally decrees for specific performance, injunction, restitution,
reformation and the like. Even then latitude for judicial maneuver
normally is restricted to withholding a particular form of relief from
a disqualified party, as distinguished from granting affirmative relief
in favor of a disadvantaged party. The net result is that the main body
of traditional contract law is heavily weighted toward "legal" factors
rather than "equitable" ones.
The universal appeal to good morals sounded by the phrase "good
faith," has led our contract law to assimilate only one limited version
of that notion in the form of the good faith purchase, and only then "to
the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elab-
orate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession
of property by one who offers it for sale or to secure a loan."55 The
good faith purchaser is a familiar legal figure. On the other hand, the
older Roman concept of a general obligation of good faith in the per-
formance of contracts has not fared so well in English or American
law and
[B]y the time of the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial
Code, good faith performance had, in spite of its ancient lineage,
become a poor and neglected relation of good faith purchase. The
Code revives it and uses good faith in both senses - good faith
purchase and good faith performance."
Thus another one of Karl Llewellyn's legal "base lines" came to be
expressly incorporated in the Code. There may be no effective general
obligation of good faith in the law of contract, but in the law of com-
mercial contracts there is an obligation of commercial good faith.
55. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALI L.J.
1057 (1954).
56. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 53, at 671.
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The Code concept of commercial good faith is complex, has sub-
stance and judicial weight. The "good faith" of family relations can
provide little or no guidance in judicial decision-making because the
notion is rooted in "good morals" and thus has the legal characteristics
of the chancellor's foot. Nor is the Code concept merely the rather
cynical "good faith" of the "layman" which is roughly equated to any-
conduct-this-side-of-crime. The Code concept of good faith commercial
dealing is inextricably linked with commercial customs and usages and
consigned for implementation to the judiciary.
A. Commercial Good Faith Concept
Any fair appraisal of the "good faith" requirements imposed by
the Uniform Commercial Code will reveal a significant jurisprudential
shift toward obligation-based-on-transactional fair dealing. The Code
imposes on every contracting party the general "obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement," and throughout the Code specific
provisions in every article impose an explicit good faith requirement
in several contexts. Professor Farnsworth has stated that "good faith"
is mentioned at least fifty times in the 400 sections of the Code. The
phrase also must appear at least fifty times in the comments, and cross-
referencing multiplies the impact. No accurate count is available re-
flecting the total number of times "good faith" or its synonyms appear
in all the Code provisions and comments. But the sheer number of
references does not alone establish that the good faith obligation is "a
basic principle running throughout this Act." Nor would mere proof of
that assertion thereby establish its juridical significance without further
reference to the substantive content of the good faith principle including
the legal mechanism with which the Code proposes to implement any
such vague principle.
The Code definition of "good faith" is "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned. '5 7 This is a subjective quality in
"good faith purchase" and normally an objective one in "good faith
performance."I s But a more meaningful statement of the commercial
good faith principle appears in the comment to the section which im-
poses the general obligation of good faith:
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(19).
58. Farnsworth notes that an objective "good faith" must be intended in the good
faith performance aspects of the Code because:
Would a test based on the individual's actual state of mind with no appeal to
common practices make any sense in these cases? Surely the test is not whether
one party actually believed that he was acting decently, fairly or reasonably.
Surely he must do more than form an honest judgment. Otherwise no more
than knowing and deliberate unfairness, maliciousness, trickery and deceit would
be forbidden.
Farnsworth, supra note 53, at 672.
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The principle involved is that in commercial transactions good
faith is required in the performance and enforcement of all agree-
ments or duties... [and] is further implemented by section 1-205
on course of dealing and usage of trade ... [and concerning sales]
contracts made by a merchant have incorporated in them the
explicit standard not only of honesty in fact (section 1-201), but
also of observance by the merchant of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade.59
This "principle" is called "central to the entire Code," and together
with express reliance on "current course" aspects of commercial activity
and "custom, usage and agreement of the parties," hopefully will "give
freedom to individual action while preventing surprise and traps for
the unwary." 60 The jurisprudential essence of the commercial good
faith concept promulgated in the Code is "the linking of the good faith
obligation of performance with reasonable commercial standards" which
runs throughout the entire Code, although "its formulation . . . [in
particular articles] reflects a functional difference in situation."'"
Five particular types of commercial good faith have been identified
in the Code: 1) the general obligation of good faith performance of
contracts, 2) mercantile good faith performance, 3) good faith pur-
chase (of goods or paper), 4) good faith enforcement of legal remedies,
most often explicitly accompanied by the recurring phrase "commer-
cially reasonable," and, 5) good faith diligence. 62 The most persuasive
categorization of these many faces of good faith is that the particular
substantive content of a given good faith provision depends upon its
functional context. Thus, the theme of good faith performance which
runs through the sales article presupposes that either party to the sales
contract may be, and both are likely to be, professionals and so "the
linking of honesty and commercial reasonableness is made general";
on the other hand, the "professional," in the case of negotiable instru-
ments questions, is more likely to be the purchaser of the paper; while
in secured transactions matters the "professional tends to be the lender"
and the good faith enforcement requirement is only meaningful if im-
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE § 1-203, comment 19.
60. Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. Rgv.
167, 168 (1964). This theme is echoed by the Code in section 2-302, the unconscion-
able contract or clause provision, which comment 1 states is designed for "the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise (Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80
(3d Cir. 1948))" and is to be implemented by application of a "basic test" whether
the contract or clause is "so one-sided as to be unconscionable" in light of com-
mercial circumstances.
61. Mentschikoff, supra note 60, at 168.
62. Good faith purchase, good faith performance and mercantile good faith are
identified by Professor Farnsworth, supra note 53, in addition, good faith diligence
is identified in Note, Good Faith Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. PITT.
L. Rtv. 754 (1962). Good faith enforcement of legal duties is identified in Mooney,
The Old and The New: Article IX, 16 ARK. L. Rgv. 145 (1961).
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posed on him instead of the borrower.68 The key figure is that dramatis
personae, the "professional," who may appear in many guises. Playing
the role of good faith performer of contracts he appears as the "mer-
chant" in the sales article who may be either a buyer or seller of
goods. 4 Appearing as the good faith purchaser he becomes the holder
in due course in the negotiable instruments article,65 the bona fide pur-
chaser of a security under article 8,66 and the acquirer of a document
of title by "due negotiation" under article 7.67 Finally, performing the
role of a secured lender, the "professional" may be the commercially
reasonable secured party under article 9,08 the bank issuer of a letter of
credit in article 5,69 or the good faith bailee under article 7.7o Our
professional not only projects the superlative human quality of "honesty
in fact" but also must display the peculiar characteristics of "mercantile
good faith and fair dealing" prevalent in the particular trade in which
he may be engaged when discovered.
Technically speaking, it may be impossible for even the most
diligent dialer of Code provisions to spell out the precise legalistic path
through the trackless forest of text, comments and cross-references
whereby one starts with the general obligation of good faith perform-
ance, converts into honesty-in-fact plus observance-of-reasonable-com-
mercial-standards-of-fair-dealing-in-the-trade and arrives at automatic
construction of the statutory phrase "good faith" to include both cri-
teria. Llewellyn may have failed to restore in effect the original general
obligation of good faith excised in 1952, as Professor Farnsworth
speculates, 7' but there would seem to be little doubt that he succeeded
in several respects. The Code clearly imposes on all Code contracting
parties the duty of subjective honesty in fact and obligates sales mer-
chant parties also to observe commercial standards of fair dealing in
their trade. In addition, depending upon the particular context, a pro-
fessional will be explicitly bound by his trade standards of fair dealing
or, at the bare minimum, will be subject to trade customs including
those relating to fair dealing. This scheme touches most Code parties.
Moreover, perhaps the tortuous manual and mental dexterity suggested
above is unnecessary because of the Code provisions specifically directed
to courts and which set up rules for interpreting all agreements under
the Code.
63. Mentschikoff, supra note 60, at 168-69.
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104(1).
65. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(1).
66. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302.
67. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-501(4).
68. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504.
69. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-109.
70. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-407.
71. Farnsworth, supra note 53, at 676-77.
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B. Mechanism for Implementation
I suppose everyone would agree that whatever else one may pump
into the magic phrase "commercial standards of fair dealing," at rock-
bottom its content rests on the particular commercial context to which
the provision embodying it or its synonym applies. This suggests that
courts are to find the precise content of the mercantile good faith
standard in the facts of the case and not in the words of the Code. 2
Specific rules for the guidance of courts interpreting contracts
under the Code comes from several points. There is, of course, the
admonition expressly directed to courts by the first section in the
Code that:
This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies . . . [which are] (b) to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
and the final paragraph of comment 1 notes that "the text of each
section should be read in light of the purpose and policy of the rule or
principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole. . . ." For what-
ever such precatory words are worth, these statements addressed
specifically to courts faced with contract controversies arising under the
Code seem to counsel them to ground their rulings whenever possible
on commercial practices and trade usages. But the Code does more
than admonish in general terms; it provides generally for the super-
imposition of commercial fair dealing in good faith by means of express
statutory language in innumerable sections and comments, and, more
importantly, the introductory article which is applicable to the entire
72. This assertion in no way conflicts with the Code interpretation methodology
advocated by Professor Hawkland. Asserting the proposition that the Uniform
Commercial Code is a true "code" in the Roman sense, albeit a form of "common-law
code," Professor Hawkland points out that the key elements of a true code are pre-
emption, system, and comprehension:
This requires: (1) That its provisions be logically presented and coordinated and
stated in language employing a chosen and consistent terminology; (2) that
means be made available to handle competing and conflicting rules; (3) that
means be provided to fill the gaps; and (4) that supereminent provisions be
present to mitigate harshness which might otherwise flow from rigid rules....
The Uniform Commercial Code meets these requirements .... [Therefore] courts
construing it should make three changes in their standard legal method. They
should: (1) use analogy, rather than 'outside' law, to fill code gaps; (2) rely
somewhat more heavily on the decisions of other code states in making their
own decisions; and (3) give their own decisions somewhat less permanent
precedential value.
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 299-300,
313. A most felicitous example of judicial construction of the Code by analogy to
other Code provisions as far as was intellectually possible, then resort to "outside"
law in order to extend the unpaid seller's lien to cover proceeds from the resale of
the goods is the o pinion by Justice Palmore in Greater Louisville Auto Auction v.
Ogle Buick Co., 387 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1965).
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Code, provides a mechanism for courts to open the contract and pour
into its language the Roman wine of good faith.
This all-important mechanism is structured into section 1-205
which is concerned with course of dealing and usage of trade. These
are defined:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between
the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be re-
garded as establishing a common basis of understanding for inter-
preting their expressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question.
The succeeding four subsections specify the legal effect to be given by
a court to these facts. Subsection (3) provides:
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade
in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they
are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement
or qualify terms of an agreement.
Courts are thereby required to take cognizance of any course of dealing
between the parties or usage of trade in their vocation in any contro-
versy over the meaning of their agreement. The clear import of these
provisions is that standards of commercial fair dealing, either estab-
lished by the parties or by the customs of their trade, are implicit in
their agreement. The comments also bear out this construction of the
section. Comment 5 notes that this provision permits "full recog-
nition . . . [to] usages currently observed by the great majority of
decent dealers, even thought dissenters ready to cut corners do not
agree." Even more pointedly, comment 6 notes that
the policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts
and clauses (Sections 1-203, 2-302) applies to implicit clauses
which rest on usage of trade ... the anciently established policing
of usage by the courts is continued to the extent necessary to cope
with the situation arising if an unconscionable or dishonest prac-
tice should become standard.
Specific citation to section 1-203 links up the general obligation of good
faith, commercial customs and usages, unconscionable contracts and
judicial interpretation of all agreements under the Code in what
Llewellyn was wont to call an "iron section" because the duty cannot
be avoided by contract. (Section 1-102(3) - "the obligations of good
faith . . . may not be disclaimed by agreement," and comment 2 cites
specifically to section 1-205.)
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These all link up and section 1-205(4) prescribes the rules for
judicial interpretation of Code agreements in light of applicable trade
custom and usage:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed whenever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but when such construction is un-
reasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage
of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
Comment 1 sets forth the general purpose of the entire provision and
further tends to establish that the intended function of section 1-205
is to serve as the general judicial interpretation guidance provision
for the Code:
This Act rejects both the 'lay-dictionary' and the 'conveyancer's'
reading of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the
agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language used
by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances. The
measure and background for interpretation are set by the com-
mercial context, which may explain and supplement even the
language of a formal or final writing.
To close out the matter subsection (6) explicitly provides that evi-
dence of a relevant usage of trade may be introduced by either party
upon notice to the other.
Combination of these provisions into a meaningful judicial inter-
pretation system culminates in the following grounds for interpretation
of commercial agreements under the Code in the order of preference:
1) The express terms; and
2) Course of dealing or usage of trade; or,
3) Course of performance under section 2-208
Essential to any such determination of meaning is trade custom con-
cerning commercial standards of fair dealing in the parties' vocation
or fairly implied by their prior course of dealing. In addition, the court
is to take such factors into account where the good faith and com-
mercial fair dealing criteria are explicitly imposed by the particular
Code provision applicable to the precise point in controversy.
The syllogism cast at the beginning of this monograph closes
smoothly by calling attention to the uncanny parallelism displayed by
the judicial interpretation mechanism in section 1-205 and the defini-
tion of agreement which marks the substantive beginning of the Code.
Agreement is the bargain of the parties in fact manifested by their
language or other circumstances "including course of dealing or usage
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of trade or course of performance" under sections 1-205 and 2-208
(section 1-201(3)). Courts are to give meaning to commercial agree-
ments by reference to the parties' language "and by their action, read
and interpreted in light of commercial practices and other surrounding
circumstances" (section 1-205, comment 3). This entire operation
should be judicially conducted by means of a liberal construction and
application of the Code so as to promote the expansion of commercial
practices (section 1-101).
One may call this jurisprudential theme whatever he chooses
but it seems clear that it is a baseline."8 It is here called "commercial
good faith" to distinguish it from the many different technical kinds
of specific and general duties of good faith. Grounding judicial inter-
pretation of commercial agreements on trade custom and usage, in-
cluding general and special duties of good faith, is a far cry from the
emphasis by traditional contract law on "contract" concepts and it
permits courts to continue doing what they have been doing all along,
namely, seeking meaning from trade custom, without having to manipu-
late contract concepts in order to reach a reasonable result.
V.
THE PEDAGOGICAL VALUES OF BOOKBURNING
Our general theory of contract has been mortally wounded by the
Uniform Commercial Code. Not killed outright by the blow, its grip
on the law is greatly weakened. It will surely suffer most pitiably under
the combined effects of the Code and our increasing awareness of the
unbridgeable gap between contract theology and the realities of the
socio-economic workings of our industrial democracy. Thirty-five years
ago Karl Llewellyn gave warning of what was to come when he looked
down the years and sounded the trumpet-call for reform in his charac-
teristic legal-romantic prose:
Marginal cases, Hospital cases, most of our cases well may be.
Much doctrine, however sweetly spun, serves chiefly to grow grey
with dust against the rafters. Overwhelming is the certainty that
any synthesis which is to match with the meaning of the law in
Life must expand beyond the futile limits set by present legal
theory to include great blocks of what we know as property, and
equity, and remedies, to cover as well the most significant parts of
business associations, and who knows what besides. Overwhelm-
ing is the realization of how far a law still built in the ideology
of Adam Smith has been meshed into the new order of mass-
73. Professor Patterson has referred to this feature as a "supereminent principle."
Patterson, The Codification of Commercial Law in the Light of Jurisprudence, RZPORT
O1' THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION 1'OR 1955 - STUDY O THt UNIPORM COMMtDCIAL
CoDs, N.Y. LEG. Doc. (1955) No. 65.
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production, mass-relationships. Overwhelming in no less measure
is the conviction that broad forms of words are chaos, that only
in close study of the facts salvation lies.7"
The Code may not accomplish that in one fell swoop. But it rests at
a threshold between old doctrine and new jurisprudence and represents
the flower of the legal realist movement in American law. The Code
is a "fresh start" in more ways than one.
There is increasing evidence that rotting old contract doctrine has
been supporting a law of contract which, at least since the Civil War,
has been utterly irrelevant to commercial life in this country. Durk-
heim's intuitive study of the non-legal elements in business75 is even
now in the process of being validated by empirically based studies of
current business contracting practices. Tentative returns from a com-
prehensive study being conducted by Professor Stewart Macaulay in-
dicate that the business world seldom uses our contract law, fears and
distrusts both contract law and lawyers and is unlikely to change in
the future.
76
His tentative conclusions are that in making contracts: 1) busi-
nessmen prefer to rely on a man's word in a brief letter, a handshake,
or "common honesty and decency," even when the transaction in-
volves "legally enforceable contracts"; 2) "commitments are to be
honored in almost all situations" because "one does not welsh on a
deal" and, as for quality disputes, "one ought to produce a good product
and stand behind it." Should controversy arise over a contract, busi-
nessmen believe "you can settle any dispute if you keep the lawyers and
accountants out of it" because "they just do not understand the give-and-
take needed in business," and legalistic contracts impair the necessary
"flexibility" in dispute settlement. Nothing makes a businessman more
irate than the invocation of legalism at him. The plain, sad truth of the
matter is that our contract law is unnecessary in most business situa-
tions, not only because non-legal devices function better to serve the
needs of the parties but, even more importantly, because its use nor-
mally leads to such highly undesirable results as the "divorce ending
the 'marriage' between two businesses" and severe business interrup-
tions which make the litigation game not worth the candle. Only when
all is lost do businessmen invoke the law of contract.
The only valuable commercial function to which the law of contract
arguably lends any support is the record-keeping function. Modern
74. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 751 (1931).
75. DURKHEIM, THi DIVISION or LABOR IN SOCIETY 227 (1964).
76. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
1963 AMtR. Soc. Rev. 55.
77. Note, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-appraisal
in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038, 1064 (1957).
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business enterprises have a prodigious record-keeping burden for ac-
counting purposes, and to some undefined degree contract law and its
handmaiden, the Statute of Frauds, may reinforce the hands of the
corporate accounting division and house counsel in their internal
struggle against the sales division over the necessity for keeping records.
This is a sad commentary on the once-proud law of contract. It has
fallen into a social desuetude from whence it will likely never arise.
But there is also evidence of the ineffectuality of orthodox contract
law from within the body of law itself. Gradually evolving from a
blend of tort and contract is the modern law of products liability.
Responding to the needs of our consumer economy, this growing body
of law eschews the crippling doctrinal limitations imposed by orthodox
contract doctrine, side-steps privity and blasts through procedural bar-
ricades to ground liability on a theory of "enterprise liability.""8 Many
of the institutions, norms and practices of the whole field of govern-
ment contracting stand in stark contrast to classical contract theory. 9
Collective bargaining agreements, 0 pension and retirement "plans,"'
adhesion contracts," the securities marketing system, 3 and the whole
sweep of "private law-making" by contract,"4 none of these can be
meaningfully accommodated within the traditional offer-acceptance-
consideration model. A theory of contract which substantially ignores
the significance of $80 billion in pension funds, intimate regulation of
day-to-day industrial conduct of seven million people and several thou-
sand corporations, over $40 billion in government procurement pur-
chases annually and the realities of a corporate equities distribution
and exchange system made up of the contracting activities of 20 million
people involving millions of dollars daily, simply cannot be taken seri-
ously. Especially not when all the evidence currently in the record
indicates that in fact our law of contract is not only unnecessary, except
in pedestrian mercantile situations, but is positively dysfunctional. The
mind boggles at the enormity of its pretensions.
78. The early role of contract in this evolution appears in Llewellyn, On War-
ranty of Quality and Society - I, 36 COLUM. L. Rzv. 699 (1936), and its current
contributions are explored in Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern
Sales Law, Part I, 74 YALn L.J. 262 (1964).
79. The two-part study which appears as Government Contracts, 29 LAW &
CONTtMP. PROB. 1 (1964), fully documents the many ways in which "a government
contract is quite distinct from its private counterpart" as the foreword warns.
80. Friedman, Changing Functions of Contract in the Common Law, 15 U.
TORONTO L.J. 15, 25 (1951).
81. Note, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Group Insurance Policies, 36
COLUM. L. Rev. 89 (1936). For an attempt to use contract concepts to analyze a
three-party group annuity funded union pension plan see Hudson v. John Hancock
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1963).
82. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Economic and Legal Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rtv. 629 (1943).
83. U.S. v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); II REPORT o1 THE
SPECIAL STUDY Or THE SECURITIES MARKET, chapters IV and V (1963).
84. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocMTY (1959).
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"Pretensions" is the correct word to use. In the final analysis it
can fairly be said that commerce has survived despite the artificialities
of contract theology, survived and prospered. The businessman simply
does not waste his time on the legalistic requirements of contract law
and will not go to court if he can possibly avoid it. Macaulay notes:
[O]nly 2,779 out of 58,293 civil actions filed in the United States
District Court in fiscal year 1961 involved private contracts.
During the same period only 3,447 of the 61,138 civil cases filed
in the principal trial courts of New York State involved private
contracts.8 5
How useful is a law of contract to a society whose members refuse
to pay any attention to it in making their contracts, who avoid it when-
ever possible in settling contract disputes and whose conduct is not
affected by it in any demonstrable way?
But the greatest disservice of all is re-inculcation by the law
schools of each succeeding generation of lawyers and judges. Contracts
I may well be the jurisprudential Typhoid Mary of the law. Once the
law student is exposed to this high art of obfuscation there may be no
hope for the patient. Consider the following passage written in 1939
and still true today:
The student, and especially the neophyte, is entitled to as simple,
as understandable, as horse-sense, and as easily approachable body
of legal doctrine as the cases can be made to yield. Yet it is my
85. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 62. Footnote 9 to the text at that point is
especially interesting in light of the particular point in time when our contract
construct was developed by Langdell and Williston. Macaulay notes:
My colleague Lawrence M. Friedman has studied the work of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in contracts cases. He has found that contracts cases reaching that
court tend to involve economically-marginal-business and family-economic disputes
rather than important commercial transactions. This has been the situation since
above the turn of the century. Only during the Civil War period did the court
deal with significant numbers of important contracts cases, but this happeped
against the background of a much simpler and different economic system.
Tenative survey by letter of the current contracting practices of General Electric,
Alcoa, Reynolds Metals, Inland Steel, Armco Steel, American Motors Sales Cor-
poration, Ford Motor Company, Jantzen, Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation, and
General Mills, Inc., indicates that these organizations have instituted some changes
in form language as a result of the Uniform Commercial Code. For the most part
this change is a result of section 2-207 in the context of the "battle of the forms"
problem when the company is acting as a seller, and it takes the form of a provision
in the "offer" requiring acceptance without qualification or addition of terms. For
example, Inland Steel Company uses an "acknowledgment" form which provides:
The terms and conditions set forth herein shall constitute the sole terms and
conditions of this contract. No terms or conditions, other than those stated herein,
whether contained in your confirmation, your purchase or shipping release forms,
or elsewhere, shall be binding upon us. All proposals, negotiations, and repre-
sentations, if any, made prior to the date of this acknowledgment are merged
herein. . . . This acknowledgment is expressly conditioned upon your assent to
the terms expressed herein. Acceptance of the goods shall constitute final accept-
ance of these terms. If these terms are not acceptable, you must so notify us at
once at our General Office at Chicago, Illinois.
This is an elaborate example; Jantzen simply inserts into their offer the statement
that "this order is subject to the conditions on the face and reverse of this form."
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belief that the classroom lags in this matter of offer and acceptance
materially behind the more advanced state of present orthodox
theory. It is my belief that the beginning student meets the
Langdellian unilateral in materially balder form, as one of his two
basic contracts concepts, than one finds in convenient fat type, for
instance, in the Restatement ... if the world of law is thus at its
very creation in a student's mind created in divisions and in con-
cepts which falsify the facts of law, the student is helpless. The
false concepts give him his only eyes to see that legal world, his
only words to describe it. All later effort at qualification leaves
it permanently distorted to him. 6
Shortly after he wrote that passage Karl Llewellyn began drafting
the sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code. Many of the changes
this Code made in the rules of contract law have been already men-
tioned and the doctrinal shifts are quite apparent. One is free to see
the Code as a loose arrangement of rules or an arrangement of loose
rules - however it may appear to him. But anyone who looks back
over the economic and social changes of the past 50 years to the time
of Langdell cannot help but note in utter amazement that the current
crop of contracts casebooks is not substantially different from those
in use then. 7 Here stands the world on the threshold of space travel
and there stands the law of contract in an Elizabethan garden.
The perspicacious have begun to sense the jurisprudential earth-
quake, however, and Professor Edward J. Murphy, himself a budding
contracts casebook producer, has recently noted the profound impact
of Code concepts on such hardy perennials as Williston on Contracts,
and has pointed the direction the Dutch Elm Blight of the Code will
take through the forest of old contract doctrine.88 Even more significant
is the fact that the Second Restatement of Contracts has capitulated
many strategic positions to Karl Llewellyn under the doctrinal pressures
generated by the Code. Professor Robert Braucher notes candidly that
in the Second Restatement "particular effort has been made to reconcile
both black letter and comment ...with such statutory formulations
86. Llewellyn, Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE
L.J. 779, 783 (1939).
87. An obvious exception is KtsSL0a & SHARP, CONTRACTS (1953).
88. Murphy, reviewing WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1960), 37 NOTRE DAM E
LAw. 465 (1962), suggests that the Code may provide a basis for counsel to argue in
analogous cases, viz., leases now held invalid because they are an "agreement to
agree" and unenforcible under traditional contracts rules, or employment contracts
now too "indefinite" to be enforced. Of these types of situations he notes:
Will not the Code help force at least a reappraisal of similar decisions? It takes
no crystal ball, in my opinion, to foresee a trend toward greater judicial enforce-
ment of many heretofore 'vague and indefinite' promises. Similarly, may we not
expect the number of so-called 'illusory promises' to decline sharply, since the
Code imposes a fundamental obligation upon all parties to act in good faith?
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as the Uniform Commercial Code." 9 He first tacitly acknowledges the
impact of the legal realists of the 1930's, especially Karl Llewellyn,
upon the Restatement theory of contract, and then notes that the great
dichotomy between unilateral and bilateral contract, which Llewellyn
castigated so adroitly, has been dropped; and, finally, he lists some
areas of doctrinal change attributable to Llewellyn's Code: mutual
assent, option contracts, revocability, indefiniteness, and acceptance.
All in all, Llewellyn nearly swept the board clean. Yet at a recent
workshop on the Uniform Commercial Code an overwhelming number
of the contracts and commercial law professors present indicated that
commercial law is still being taught from the same old cases in the
same old way. Offer-acceptance-consideration and Slade's case still
rule in the classroom.
A thousand old professorial notes may have to burn and ten thou-
sand pounds of dusty hornbooks may be lost in the conflagration, but
a more realistic theory of contract will have to be formulated in order
to accommodate this Code. It will not fit into the general theory of
contract taught today. Reformation will have to be undertaken if the
law schools expect to educate young men who are not technologically
unemployable the day they graduate. The Code offers the first and
best baseline for that better theory.
So goes this contract parable.
89. Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YAL L.J.
302 (1964).
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